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As drug dealers, Stephanie and Keith Anthony Cannon needed to
protect their business. They needed guns and turned to Sherbrooke,
a man with a ready supply.2 The Cannons did not know that Sher-
3brooke was also an undercover police officer. The Cannons met
Sherbrooke four times. During the first three meetings the Cannons
bought five handguns from Sherbrooke and stated that they wished to
buy more. At the fourth meeting, Sherbrooke introduced the Can-
nons to a man named Keating who-unbeknownst to the Cannons-
was also an undercover agent.5 The Cannons expected to sell cocaine
to Keating and Sherbrooke and to purchase handguns from them.
Keating and Sherbrooke, however, planned to arrest the Cannons.
Although the Cannons had never requested a machine gun, Keating
brought one along to the meeting. "After additional conversation,
and some salesmanship by [Sherbrooke] and [Keating], [the Can-
nons] also purchased one of the machine guns. The guns were not
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6 See Cannon, 886 F. Supp. at 706.
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loaded and no ammunition was included in the sale."8 The Cannons
left the meeting and were immediately arrested.
Things got worse for the defendants. A federal statute "imposes a
mandatory five year sentence for the use of a firearm, but increases
the term to thirty years if the firearm is a machine gun."9 Thus, be-
cause Keating had the foresight to bring a machine gun, the Can-
nons, who had held "an unloaded machine gun in [their] posses-
sion.., for a matter of moments," faced an additional twenty-five
years in prison.'0
The district court refused to sentence the defendants to an extra
twenty-five years in prison. The court noted that "[t]here was no le-
gitimate law enforcement purpose served" by selling the machine
gun." "The decision to arrest had been made prior to the meeting,
and the presence of the machineguns [sic] could not make the de-
fendants any more guilty of the offense than they would have been if
only handguns had been.., purchased." 2  Because "the ma-
chineguns [sic] were nothing more than a gratuitous experiment" to
increase the defendants' sentence by six-fold, the court held that the
officers' conduct constituted sentencing manipulation, and as a result
excluded the machine gun from consideration at sentencing.1
The Cannons' case is one among many. Under the recently
adopted Federal Sentencing Guidelines ("Sentencing Guidelines" or
"Guidelines"), crimes are quantified based upon the amount of harm
caused.4 In the Cannons' case, the guns were quantified. A firearm
was worth five years, a machine gun twenty-five more. The Sentenc-
8 Id. at 708. The Eighth Circuit viewed the facts differently. Whereas the district
court stressed the police officers' initiative in delivering unasked-for machine guns, see
id. at 706, the court of appeals stressed the defendants' interest and enthusiasm in
purchasing the machine guns once they were brought to the meeting, see Cannon, 88
F.d at 1505, and the reasonableness of the officers' conduct, see id. at 1507.
9 Cannon, 886 F. Supp. at 707 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (1) (1994)).
"0 Id. at 708.
" Id.
12 Id.
is Id. at 708-09. The judgment of the district court was eventually reversed, not
due to the district court's finding of sentencing manipulation, but rather due to
prosecutorial misconduct during closing arguments. See Cannon, 88 F.3d at 1503.
Nonetheless, the Eighth Circuit made it clear it would not countenance the district
court's findings of sentencing manipulation. The Eighth Circuit found that the de-
fendants were predisposed to purchase the machine guns, see id. at 1505, and that "the
officers' conduct in this case was not so shocking that it crossed over the constitutional
line," id. at 1507.
14 See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL 4-5 (1995).
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ing Guidelines rarely account for individual and extenuating circum-
stances. Thus, the fact that the Cannons may not have been predis-
posed to purchase the machine guns or the fact that the undercover
agents might have encouraged them to purchase the machine guns
was irrelevant to their sentences. As a consequence, undercover
agents such as Keating and Sherbrooke can structure their stings and
busts to maximize sentences. Some courts have responded, as the
Cannon district court did, by adopting sentencing manipulation or
sentencing entrapment as defenses to the sentences that would oth-
erwise be imposed by the Sentencing Guidelines.
This Comment inquires into the authority of a federal court to
adopt new sentencing defenses. Part I explains the desirability of sen-
tencing entrapment and sentencing manipulation as defenses against
sentences that would otherwise be imposed by the Sentencing Guide-
lines. Both sentencing entrapment and sentencing manipulation de-
fenses would mitigate the harsh consequences of the Sentencing
Guidelines, counter improper police conduct, and tailor sentences to
fit a defendant's culpability.
The desirability of a defense, however, does not necessarily give a
court the authority to adopt it. Part II defines sentencing entrapment
and sentencing manipulation. Because these defenses are still in
their formative years, no single definition for either defense has
emerged. For purposes of this Comment, a careful definition of each
defense is important because whether a court has the authority to es-
tablish a defense depends on what the defense purports to do. Part
III considers the possible legal foundations of the sentencing en-
trapment and sentencing manipulation defenses. This Comment
concludes that a court would be overstepping its authority if it
adopted either the sentencing entrapment or sentencing manipula-
tion defenses. Yet, the problems of police misconduct and sentences
unrelated to culpability remain. Thus, Part IV considers which
branch, if not the judicial branch, could best formulate a remedy.
I. DEVELOPMENT OF SENTENCING DEFENSES: THE FEDERAL
SENTENCING GUIDELINES AND PROBLEMS THEREIN
A. Sentencing Before 1984: The Height ofJudicial Discretion
Sentencing entrapment and sentencing manipulation would not
exist were it not for recent changes in the way federal courts sentence
1997]
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criminals. Prior to 1984, judges possessed extraordinary discretion in
sentencing defendants.'5 While Congress set maximum sentences, a
judge could impose a sentence anywhere up to that maximum.1 6 A
judge did not have to write an opinion explaining how she arrived at
a particular sentence.'7  Nor were sentences generally appealable 8
Because judges had few guidelines beyond their own discretion,
"disparity in sentencing was the norm." 9 As similarly situated defen-
dants received widely disparate sentences, criticism of the sentencing
system increased. 0
"s See Marvin E. Frankel, Lawlessness in Sentencing, 41 U. CIN. L. REV. 1, 1 (1972)
(describing this system as "a bizarre 'non-system' of extravagant powers"); see also Rob-
ert S. Johnson, The Ills of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines and the Search for a Cure: Using
Sentence Entrapment to Combat Governmental Manipulation of Sentencing, 49 VAND. L. REV.
197, 198 (1996) ("Under the old sentencing system, discretion over sentencing re-
sided with judges." (footnote omitted)); Robert Eldridge Underhill, Sentence Entrap-
ment: A Casualty of the War on Crime 1994 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 165, 180 ("[Flederal
judges, under a so-called indeterminate scheme, had virtually unreviewable power to
impose sentences upon the convicted."). In United States v. Staufer, 38 F.3d 1103,
1107-08 (9th Cir. 1994), the court lamented its loss of discretion under the Sentencing
Guidelines and noted that without that discretion the courts could no longer control
governmental abuses.
16 SeeJohnson, supra note 15, at 203 ("Congress provided only a broad sentencing
range, sometimes between zero and twenty-five years." (footnote omitted)); Underhill,
supra note 15, at 180 ("[M]ost federal statutes merely set maximum penalties and
permittedjudicial discretion up to that point.").
17 See Johnson, supra note 15, at 203 ("[T]he judge was not obligated to give rea-
sons for the sentence .... "); Underhill, supra note 15, at 181 ("Prior to the [Federal
Sentencing] Guidelines, judges were not even required to write opinions supporting
their sentences.").
18 SeeJohnson, supra note 15, at 203. One report noted that in the Second Circuit
the same case might produce sentences ranging from three to twenty years of impris-
onment. See id. at 202 (citing ANTHONY PARTRIDGE & WILLIAM B. ELDRIDGE, THE
SECOND CIRCUIT SENTENCING STUDY: A REPORT TO THE JUDGES OF THE SECOND
CIRCUIT 1-3 (Federal Judicial Center, 1974)). Sentences also varied according to ge-
ography, race and gender. For instance, in the South, sentences for the same crime
tended to be six months longer than the national average. In California, sentences
were 12 months shorter than the national average. Male bank robbers served six
months longer than female bank robbers, and black bank robbers convicted in the
South served approximately thirteen months longer than similarly situated bank rob-
bers in other geographical regions. See id. (citing Sentencing Guidelines, Hearings on
H.R 3307Before the Subcomm. on CriminalJustice of the House Comm. on theJudiciaty, 100th
Cong. 665, 675-77 (1987) (statement of Ilene H. Nagel, Commissioner, Sentencing
Commission)).
19 Id. at 201 (footnote omitted).
20 See Underhill, supra note 15, at 165 ("[M]any commentators viewed uncon-
trolled judicial discretion as the principal vice of the then existing system." (footnote
omitted)); see also id. at 180 ("As faith in rehabilitation failed and fear of crime in-
creased, the indeterminate approach in general, and judicial discretion specifically,
received widespread criticism."). Broad judicial discretion was not the only subject of
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B. Reform and the Sentencing Guidelines: Quantity-Driven Punishment
In 1984, in response to the criticisms, Congress enacted the Sen-
tencing Reform Act. The Sentencing Reform Act created the
United States Sentencing Commission ("Commission") as an agency
within the judiciary.2 Over the next three years, the Commission de-
veloped the Sentencing Guidelines, which went into effect in 1987.2
Through the Sentencing Guidelines, the Commission sought to
achieve uniformity in sentencing.24 "Uniformity in sentencing" means
that similar criminals, committing similar crimes, will receive substan-
tially similar sentences.2 To achieve uniformity, the Commission es-
tablished a 258-box grid. Along one axis of the grid lies the severity
of the offense. To the extent possible, the Commission quantified
the severity of an offense.5 For example, in the case of drug crimes
the severity of the offense is based on the amount of drugs a defen-
27dant has bought, sold or possessed. In economic crimes such as
complaints regarding the pre-1984 sentencing structure. Critics also attacked the pa-
role system which determined the actual length of a sentence served. SeeJohnson, su-
pra note 15, at 202 ("Since the Parole Commission controlled when a prisoner would
be released, the sentence imposed by ajudge was not the actual amount of time a de-
fendant would serve." (footnote omitted)). Parole added another element of disparity
to the system. See id. ("[A] judge might sentence a defendant to twelve years, but the
Parole Commission could release him after four." (footnote omitted)).
21 Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 2019 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C. and 28 U.S.C. (1994)).
See28 U.S.C. § 991 (1994).
2 See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL 2 (1995). The Commission submitted
the proposed Guidelines to Congress for review on April 13, 1987. The Guidelines
"took effect on November 1, 1987, and apply to all offenses committed on or after that
date." Id. at 1.
24 See id. at 2. The Commission had three goals it sought to achieve through the
Guidelines: honesty, uniformity and proportionality in sentencing. See id. "Honesty
in sentencing" meant that a defendant would serve the actual length of the sentence
imposed by the court, rather than be released on parole before the sentence was half-
served; this required the abolition of the parole system. See id. at 1-2. "Proportionality
in sentencing" meant that the Guidelines would impose "appropriately different sen-
tences for criminal conduct of differing severity" and of differing harm. See id. at 2.
However, Commissioner Ilene Nagel admitted that "the Sentencing Commission was
more concerned with uniformity-making sentences alike, than with proportional-
ity-insuring the likeness of those grouped together for similar sentences." Johnson,
supra note 15, at 206.
25 See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL 2 (1995).
See Underhill, supra note 15, at 192 ("In creating proportionality in sentencing,
Congress sought to punish larger quantities of certain crimes more severely because
they were considered more harmful.").
See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2Dl.1; see also Sandra Guerra, The
New Sentencing Entrapment and Sentence Manipulation Defenses, 7 FED. SENTENCING REP.
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fraud, money laundering, bribery or counterfeiting, the severity of an
offense is determined by the amount of money involved in the illicit
transaction.2 Additionally, a criminal's sentence might be stepped up
due to an aggravating factor such as the presence of a gun,2 the
transaction's proximity to a school,30 or the involvement of a pregnant
woman in the transaction.3'
Along the other axis of the grid lie the offender's characteristics.
The Guidelines limit the personal characteristics a judge may con-
sider. Initially, Congress indicated that a judge could consider a
"defendant's age, education, vocational skills, mental and emotional
condition, physical condition (including drug dependence), previous
employment record, family ties and responsibilities, community ties,
role in the offense, criminal history, and dependence upon criminal
activity for a livelihood."02 Additionally, a judge was supposed to con-
sider the defendant's state of mind as well as her purpose in commit-
ting the crime.33 By the time the Commission submitted its proposed
Sentencing Guidelines to Congress, only three factors were deemed
relevant to setting a sentencing range: (1) a defendant's past crimi-
nal history; (2) her dependence upon the criminal activity for her
livelihood; and (3) her acceptance of responsibility for the crime.-
In 1989, the requirement that judges consider a defendant's motives
was deleted as "unnecessary." 5 In this way, the focus of the Sentenc-
181, 181 (1995) ("[T]he total amount of drugs for which an offender is held account-
able will determine the length of the sentence.").
28 See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2F. (b) (1) (fraud and deceit);
§ 2Sl.l(b) (money laundering); § 2B4.1 (commercial bribery); § 2B5.1
(counterfeiting).
See id. § 2D1.1(b) (1).
so See id. § 2D1.2(a).
31 See id.
32 Charles J. Ogletree, Jr., The Death of Discretion? Reflections on the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1938, 1953 (1988).
33 SeeJack B. Weinstein & Fred A. Bernstein, The Denigration of Mens Rea in Drug
Sentencing, 7 FED. SENTENCING REP. 121, 121 (1995).
34 See Ogletree, supra note 32, at 1953. In addition to the three factors that ajudge
must consider, the Guidelines also lists factors that ajudge may not consider. For ex-
ample:
Section 5H1.10 (Race, Sex, National Origin, Creed, Religion, and Socio-
Economic Status), § 5H1.12 (Lack of Guidance as a Youth and Similar Cir-
cumstances), the third sentence of § 5H1.4 (Physical Condition, Including
Drug Dependence and Alcohol Abuse), and the last sentence of § 5K2.12
(Coercion and Duress) list several factors that the court cannot take into ac-
count as grounds for departure.
U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL 6 (1995).
35 See Weinstein & Bernstein, supra note 33, at 121 (internal quotations omitted).
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ing Guidelines shifted from considering the defendant to considering
only the amount of harm caused.
6
A judge follows the grid-plotting the severity of the offense
against the offender's characteristics-to the appropriate sentencing
37
range and imposes a sentence within that range. The range is nar-
row. Before the Sentencing Guidelines were enacted, judges were
able to choose a sentence anywhere within a range of zero to twenty-
five years3s Under the Sentencing Guidelines the maximum possible
sentence cannot exceed the minimum by more than twenty-five per-
cent or six months, whichever is greater. 9
Ostensibly, judges are allowed to depart from the grid if they find• 40
that the case at bar presents unusual circumstances. In practice,
however, departures are rare. The Sentencing Guidelines limit de-
partures only to "'circumstance [s] of a kind, or to a degree, not ade-
quately taken into consideration by the Sentencing Commission in
formulating the guidelines.'- 4' and state "that despite the courts' legal
freedom to depart from the guidelines, they will not do so very of-
ten. "4' As one court noted, "[flew fact situations [we] re not foreseenby the Commission. 4 3 Furthermore, since the promulgation of the
See Albert W. Alschuler, The Failure of Sentencing Guidelines: A Plea for Less Aggrega-
tion, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 901, 908-09 (1991) ("It has led to the substitution of crime tar-
iffs for the consideration of situational and offender characteristics .... "); Johnson,
supra note 15, at 205.
,7 SeeJohnson, supra note 15, at 203. Manyjudges disfavor the Sentencing Guide-
lines because, among other reasons, the Guidelines reduce sentencing to mere com-
putation. See, e.g., United States v. Shepherd, 857 F. Supp. 105, 111 (D.D.C. 1994)
(lamenting the fact that judges' responsibilities are reduced "to little more than plot-
ting points on a graph and announcing [a] mathematical result"); Jose A. Cabranes,
Sentencing Guidelines: A Dismal Failure, N.Y. L.J., Feb. 11, 1992, at 2 (criticizing the
computational aspects of the Sentencing Guidelines).
SeeJohnson, supra note 15, at 203.
See 28 U.S.C. § 994(b) (2) (1994); U.S SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL 1
(1995).
40 See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b) (1994); U.S SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL 1 (1995)
("If... a particular case presents atypical features, the Act allows the court to depart
from the guidelines and sentence outside the prescribed range."); id. at 6 ("[T]he
Commission does not intend to limit the kinds of factors, whether or not mentioned
anywhere else in the guidelines, that could constitute grounds for departure in an un-
usual case.").
41 U.S SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL 5 (1995) (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b)
(1994)).
42 Id. at 6.
43 Shepher, 857 F. Supp. at 106 n.1. The court continued by stating that few fact
situations were not foreseen "whose product resemble[d] in ... detail, complexity,
and its mandatory nature, the Internal Revenue Code rather than what would nor-
mally be understood by the term 'guidelines.'" Id. The Commission expressed the
136519971
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Sentencing Guidelines, appellate courts have regularly overturned so-
called "downward departures" (the application of a lesser sentence
than the Guidelines would otherwise require),44 further dissuading
district courts from straying.45
By quantifying the severity of most offenses, restricting the indi-
vidual characteristics a court may consider, and limiting the ability to
depart from the grid, the Sentencing Guidelines aimed to impose
substantially similar sentences on criminals committing similar of-
fenses.
C. Quantity-Driven Punishment and the Creation of New Problems
The attempt-through the Sentencing Guidelines-to eliminate
the disparities under the old sentencing system, however, gave rise to
new problems and criticisms."6
1. Sentences Manipulated by Law Enforcement
One important criticism levied against the Sentencing Guidelines
is that it shifts too much discretion to prosecutors and undercover in-. 47
vestigators. In undercover operations, the prosecutor determines
same belief that most fact patterns had been accounted for. See U.S SENTENCING
GUIDELINES MANUAL 6 (1995) ("[T]he guidelines, offense by offense, seek to take ac-
count of those factors that the Commission's data indicate made a significant differ-
ence in pre-guidelines sentencing practice.").
44 See U.S SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL 5-6 (1995).
45 See, e.g., United States v. Harrington, 947 F.2d 956, 968 (D.C. Cir. 1991)
(Edwards, J., concurring) ("The appellate cases show a disparity between the relative
ease of upward departure and the niggardly application of downward adjustments.");
Johnson, supra note 15, at 204 ("[T]he courts of appeals have been very restrictive and
have held the trial courts to the Guidelines-mandated sentence even in the most com-
pelling of circumstances.").
46 See, e.g., Harrington, 947 F.2d at app. 968-70 (Edwards, J., concurring) (listing
numerous cases and articles in which judges and commentators have expressed their
displeasure with the Guidelines). Whether in fact the Guidelines have succeeded in
ameliorating the disparity problem of the pre-Guidelines sentencing regime is dis-
puted. See Cabranes, supra note 37, at 2 ("[T]he 258-box grid... does not even come
close to achieving the asserted objectives of confining discretion and eliminating the
bogeyman of disparity.... [D]isparity is ... alive and well."); Deborah Young, Rethink-
ing the Commission's Drug Guidelines: Courier Cases Where Quantity Overstates Culpability, 3
FED. SENTENCING REP. 63, 65 (1990) (noting that "the average sentences in narcotics
cases rang[e] from sixty-three months in the Eastern District of New York to one hun-
dred and six months in the Western District of Missouri and Southern District of Flor-
ida").
47 SeeUnderhill, supra note 15, at 165-66 ("With the decrease in judicial discretion,
prosecutorial power over sentencing has increased, thus inviting opportunities for
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which individuals to target, the types of criminal activities to investi-
gate, and when to terminate an investigation.8 Since sentences are
based on the quantity of drugs or amount of money involved, a prose-
cutor can easily increase a person's sentence by delaying an arrest and
thereby allowing more drug buys49 or more money to filter through
an economic crime. 0 An undercover agente1 can also affect the
length of a sentence by choosing the type of drugs sold (the penalty
for selling crack cocaine is approximately twice that of selling powder
cocaine),52 the location of a sale (e.g., near a school), or whether par-
ticular firearms are present.53 With so many decisions to make and
each decision explicitly worth a certain number of months on the
sentencing grid, prosecutors and undercover agents can directly in-
fluence the sentence a defendant will receive.-4
abuse.... In undercover sting operations, where the government often controls the
execution of the crime, the potential for abuse is heightened.").
43 See Saul M. Pilchen, The Federal Sentencing Guidelines and Undercover Sting Opera-
tions: A Defense Perspective, 4 FED. SENTENCING REP. 115, 115 (1991) (discussing prose-
cutorial discretion in guiding undercover sting operations).
4 See, e.g., United States v. Lenfesty, 923 F.2d 1293, 1300 (8th Cir. 1991)
(recapping the defendant's charge that the police agent's only motive "in repeatedly
purchasing drugs from her was to increase both the amount of drugs in the conspiracy
and her sentence"); United States v. Barth, 990 F.2d 422, 424 (8th Cir. 1993) (quoting
the district court judge who found that "it was 'not at all fortuitous that the agent ar-
rested [Barth] only after he had arranged enough successive buys to reach the magic
number (referring to 50 grams, the quantity that triggers the application of the 10-year
mandatory minimum sentence)'").
W See, e.g., United States v. Nelson, 988 F.2d 798, 809 (8th Cir. 1993), cert. denied,
114 S. Ct. 302 (1993) (indicating the court's concern that the government had "no
legitimate reason for... [continuing its investigation of fraud charges] as long as it
did"); United States v. Kaczmarski, 939 F. Supp. 1176, 1182-83 (E.D. Pa. 1996)
(holding that the government had not unnecessarily enlarged the scope of the defen-
dant's bank fraud charges even though the government had determined the amount
of checks to be deposited).
31 Oftentimes, it is not even an undercover agent who is actually performing the
investigation. Often, the police engage criminals (i.e., informants) to conduct the
sting. See United States v. Staufer, 38 F.3d 1103, 1104-05 (9th Cir. 1994) (finding that
DEA agents had a confidential informant buy the hallucinogen LSD as part of a re-
verse sting operation); Robert Weisberg, Guideline Sentencing, Traditional Defenses, and
the Evolution of Substantive Criminal Law Doctrine, 7 FED. SENTENCING REP. 168, 169-70
(1995) ("[T]he most disturbing aspect of sentencing entrapment [is] that the prime
entrappers and manipulators are not even governmental officials themselves, but paid
informants whose contingent fees may turn directly on the volume of drugs on which
sentencing is based.").
52 See, e.g., United States v. Shepherd, 857 F. Supp. 105, 112 (D.D.C. 1994) (noting
that "the defendant's compliance with the agent's demand for cooking the cocaine
would add over five years to her sentence").
See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
While many criticize prosecutorial manipulations because they result in longer
1997] 1367
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2. Punishment Unrelated to Culpability
A second criticism of the Sentencing Guidelines is that the pun-
ishments imposed do not accurately reflect a defendant's culpability."s
For instance, the Sentencing Guidelines impose longer sentences for
larger quantities of drugs. The presumption was that larger quanti-
ties would accurately reflect a person's position in a drug-selling or-
ganization.H In fact, drug kingpins hire couriers and sellers who,
when caught, will be sentenced as if they were kingpins. The harsh
sentences for less culpable defendants occur because judges can con-
sider very few of the individual circumstances surrounding a crime
and must base their sentencing decision almost entirely upon the
amount of harm involved.58
If the prosecutor or the undercover agent is, in fact, orchestrating
the illicit conduct to ensure the maximum sentence, further ques-
tions arise about a defendant's culpability and whether her sentence
is appropriate. For instance, a person may decide to commit one
criminal act but not a second criminal act. An undercover agent,
sentences, prosecutors also admit to using manipulation to arrive at lesser sentences.
SeeJohnson, supra note 15, at 206 ("[P]rosecutors and judges often refrain from im-
posing enhancements for aggravating factors because they believe the resulting sen-
tence would be far too harsh."); Mary Pat Flaherty & Robert 0. Suro, Reno Citicizes
Manipulation of U.S. Sentencing Guidelines, WASH. POST, Oct. 11, 1996, at A4
("Prosecutors acknowledged... that.., at times [they] have ignored the use of a gun
[or] tinkered with the amounts of drugs ... to reward cooperative defendants....").
55 See, e.g., Staufer 38 F.3d at 1107 (noting that under the Guidelines there is no
adequate assurance that a defendant will be sentenced on the basis or the extent of
her culpability); United States v. Harrington, 947 F.2d 956 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (Edwards,
J., concurring) ("[T]he Guidelines are rigid in formulation and, thus, often produce
harsh results that are patently unfair because they fail to take account of individual
circumstances that might militate in favor of a properly 'tailored' sentence."); Jeff
Staniels, Grading Culpability at Sentencing: The Example of Sentencing Entrapment, 7 FED.
SENTENCING REP. 178, 178-80 (1995) (arguing that defendants who commit the same
offense do not necessarily deserve the same sentence); Underhill, supra note 15, at 181
("Many judges have objected to the fact that the Guidelines lack a mechanism for
judges to account for individualized differences in defendants.").
SeeJohnson, supra note 15, at 206 ("The Guidelines prescribe sentences with the
belief that quantity of drugs reflects a defendant's position in the drug hierarchy.").
But see Staniels, supra note 55, at 180 & n.3 (noting that the Guidelines' grading system
was supposed to punish drug suppliers more severely than street vendors, but has in-
stead had the reverse effect).
57 SeeJohnson, supra note 15, at 206-07 (commenting on the fact that kingpins in-
tentionally hire couriers as a measure of protection); Staniels, supra note 55, at 180 n.3
(noting that "[s] ubstantial numbers of people who are significantly less culpable than
those targeted ... are today filling the prisons").
58 SeeYoung, supra note 46, at 63-66 (discussing the relatively meager opportunities
for downward departures in the case of a drug courier).
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knowing that the defendant will be incarcerated longer if she com-
mits a second criminal act, may encourage the individual to commit
that second act.59 If both acts are in fact committed, the sentencing
court will sentence the defendant in accordance with the commission
of both crimes without consideration for the defendant's original in-
tent.6° This is so, despite the fact that, were it not for the police insti-
gation, the second criminal act might never have been committed. In
this way, questions arise whether the punishment in fact matches a
defendant's culpability.
61
D. The Lower Courts'Response: SentencingDefenses to Deter Manipulation
and Ensure Punishment Related to Culpability
The courts are clearly troubled by police impropriety and the lack
of defendant culpability and have granted downward departures to
62remedy these problems. In United States v. Staufer the defendant
Staufer was introduced to an undercover agent through a friend who,
unbeknownst to Staufer, was a government informant.63 At the time
that Staufer was being investigated, "[hie had almost no money to his
name,... could not afford to pay rent, and had ... bills that he was
59 See, e.g., United States v. Cannon, 886 F. Supp. 705 (D.N.D. 1995) (undercover
agent encouraging defendants to buy a machine gun as well as handguns and thereby
adding 25 years to the defendants' sentence); United States v. Shepherd, 857 F. Supp.
105, 112 (D.D.C. 1994) (undercover agent encouraging defendant to sell crack co-
caine as well as powder and thereby adding five years to the defendant's sentence); see
also Jeffrey L. Fisher, When Discretion Leads to Distortion: Recognizing Pre-Arrest Sentence
Manipulation Claims Under the Federal Guidelines, 94 MICH. L. REV. 2385, 2397 (1996)
("[P]olice officers and agents are a little more savvy about these guidelines. All of a
sudden rather than busting at two buys, they're busting after seven buys. What that
does is thatjust raises those guidelines, so those guys are buried." (quoting Gerald W.
Heaney, The Reality of Guidelines Sentencing. No End to Disparity, 28 AM. CRIM. L. REV.
161, 196 n.97 (1991))).
60 See, e.g., Cannon, 88 F.3d at 1505-07 (suggesting that the trial court had acted
inappropriately when it failed to sentence defendants for possession of handguns and
a machine gun).
61 See Guerra, supra note 27, at 184 ("Presumably a person who sells, buys or trans-
ports drugs as a profession is more culpable than one who succumbs to the temptation
to make quick cash on one occasion."); Underhill, supra note 15, at 192 (comparing
the relative culpability of a defendant who set out to purchase 150 pounds of mari-
juana with the culpability of a defendant who set out to buy 30 pounds of marijuana
but was encouraged and did purchase 150 pounds).
62 38 F.3d 1103 (9th Cir. 1994).
63 See id. at 1104-05. The court also noted that the confidential informant was
"free to contact Staufer as he pleased and received little or no supervision from the
government." Id. at 1105.
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unable to pay."64 Staufer had been able to find only occasional em-
ployment, making it difficult for him to maintain a home. Making
matters worse, he had been recently robbed, beaten and hospital-
ized. 6 When Staufer met the undercover agent, Staufer expressed
that he wanted to sell 5000 doses of LSD. The undercover agent,
however, insisted that Staufer sell 10,000 doses. When Staufer ex-
pressed reluctance, the undercover agent readily suggested that he
would pay more.66 Further arrangements were made and Staufer did
eventually sell the 10,000 doses to the undercover agent. Prior to this
incident, Staufer had sold drugs only once before. At that time,
Staufer had bought twenty-five to thirty doses of LSD for fifteen dol-
lars. He then sold some of it to friends who gave him eight dollars in
return.
6 7
Staufer is the first and only case in which a court of appeals has
explicitly acknowledged sentencing entrapment as a defense and up-
held a downward departure on that basis.66 In upholding the down-
ward departure, the court indicated the same two concerns discussed
above: that government agents should not manipulate sentences and
that the sentence under the Guidelines inaccurately reflected the de-
fendant's culpability. The court stated that
government abuse can be discouraged and corrected only if courts also
are able to ensure... that defendants are predisposed to engage in a
drug deal of the magnitude for which they are prosecuted. Furthermore,
courts can ensure that the sentences imposed reflect the defendants'
degree of culpability only if they are able to reduce the sentences of de-
fendants who are not predisposed to engage in deals as large as those
induced by the government.
Similar concerns were voiced by the district court in United States
v. Shepherd.70 Shepherd was charged with one sale of powder cocaine,
two sales of crack cocaine, and the possession of a firearm during one
of the transactions.7 ' On the two occasions in which Shepherd sold
crack cocaine, she originally intended to sell powder cocaine. The





68 See id at 1108.
69 Id. at 1107.
70 857 F. Supp. 105 (D.D.C. 1994).
71 See id. at 107 n.4.
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der to crack.2 Converting powder cocaine to crack takes only a few
minutes of "cooking" in a microwave oven. r The agent was fully
aware that if Shepherd converted the powder to crack and then sold
it, she would be subject to a much lengthier sentence.7 4 In fact, had
Shepherd's sentence been calculated based upon the sales of crack
cocaine, she would have received a sentence of ten to eleven years.7s
The lower court calculated her sentence based on the intended sales
of powder cocaine. By that calculation, Shepherd's sentence was re-
duced by half-to only five years.76
The legal basis for the Shepherd court's downward departure is un-
clear from the decision. The court stated that the police practices
denied the defendant her right to "due process"77 but also fully dis-
cussed sentencing entrapment and sentencing manipulation.78 The
court's policy concerns were also made clear in the opinion. The
court first focused on the conduct of the law enforcement agent and
lamented that "[t] he ability of a law enforcement officer to enhance a
defendant's sentence through his own actions to [an] enormous de-
gree strikes at the very heart of our system ofjustice."7 But the court
also "believe [d] thatjustice, fairness and the tailoring of a sentence to
address a defendant's actual culpability retain a place within our sys-
tem."0 Accordingly, the Shepherd court "determined that it [was] ap-
propriate to calculate the defendant's sentence ... as if the sales had
involved only cocaine powder rather than crack."8' Whatever the le-
gal basis for its decision, the court obviously was concerned about
manipulation of the defendant's sentence by law enforcement and
thus attempted to tailor the defendant's sentence to her actual culpa-
bility.
7 See id. at 106.
73 See id.
74 See id. at 109 ("Agent Ross unquestionably understood the implications of his
actions .... [H]e had previously testified, in an unrelated case .... that he has in-
sisted on the conversion of cocaine to crack because he was aware of the heavier sen-
tences imposed on defendants convicted for crack offenses.").
73 See id. at 106.
76 See id.
7 Id. (stating that because of minimum sentences and the Sentencing Guidelines,
effective control of sentencing has shifted from ajudicial function to a prosecutorial
and even to a police function).
78 See id. at 111-12 (expressing the court's dismay at "the restraints Congress and
the Sentencing Commission have hoist upon sentencing courts in recent years").
9 Id. at 109.
80 Id.
81 Id.
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II. SENTENCING ENTRAPMENT AND SENTENCING MANIPULATION
DEFINED
The terms "sentencing entrapment" and "sentencing manipula-
tion" are closely related and often confused terms. In order to con-
sider whether the courts have the legal authority to adopt new de-
fenses, the definition and goal of each defense must be clear.
A. SentencingEntrapment
The term "sentencing entrapment" was coined first. In United
States v. Lenfesty,s2 the Eighth Circuit defined sentencing entrapment
as "outrageous official conduct [that] overcomes the will of an indi-
vidual predisposed only to dealing in small quantities [of drugs]."3
This definition encompasses two ideas: (1) outrageous official con-
duct and (2) the predisposition of the individual. These two ideas
have since been parsed out and applied to two separate defenses.84
The sentencing entrapment defense relates to an individual's
predisposition. "Sentencing entrapment" is the claim that the defen-
dant, although predisposed to commit a lesser offense, is coerced into
committing a greater offense with a correspondingly greater punish-
ment.85 The focus of the sentencing entrapment defense is the de-
fendant's mental state-whether she was predisposed to commit the
crime to the extent that she did. Staufer is an example of sentencing
entrapment.86 In Staufer, the defendant initially wanted to sell only
82 923 F.2d 1293 (8th Cir. 1991).
85 Id. at 1300.
84 Many but not all courts have distinguished the two defenses. See, e.g., United
States v. Garcia, 79 F.3d 74, 75 (7th Cir.) (explaining the separate theories underlying
sentencing entrapment and sentencing manipulation), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 158
(1996); United States v. Jones, 18 F.3d 1145, 1153 (4th Cir. 1994) (same); United
States v. Shephard, 4 F.3d 647, 649 (8th Cir. 1993) (same); see also Amy Levin Weil, In
Partial Defense of Sentencing Entrapment, 7 FED. SENTENCING REP. 172, 173 (1995).
While many courts and commentators have made an effort to distinguish the two
defenses, confusion and overlap still remain in many court decisions. For the pur-
poses of this Comment, however, sentencing entrapment will refer to a claim based on
the defendant's lack of predisposition and sentencing manipulation to a claim of po-
lice misconduct.
85 See United States v. Stuart, 923 F.2d 607, 614 (8th Cir. 1991) ("'Sentencing en-
trapment' as defined by the defendant, posits the situation where a defendant, al-
though predisposed to commit a minor or lesser offense, is entrapped into commit-
ting a greater offense subject to greater punishment."); United States v. Staufer, 38
F.3d 1103, 1106 (9th Cir. 1994) (citing the Stuart court's definition); Underhill, supra
note 15, at 167 (defining sentencing entrapment).
86 See Staufer, 38 F.3d at 1103.
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5000 doses of LSD. Upon the undercover agent's insistence and his
offer of more money, Staufer sold 10,000 doses. 7 Because Staufer
denied a predisposition to committing the crime to the extent
charged, Staufer's is a sentencing entrapment claim.
The Ninth Circuit in Staufer is the only court of appeals to recog-
nize sentencing entrapment and grant a downward departure on that
basis. The Eighth Circuit recognizes the defense but has never found
facts warranting a downward departure. 8s The remaining circuits
have either rejected sentencing entrapment as a theory,"9 have not
decided whether sentencing entrapment is a recognized defense,9 or
have recognized sentencing manipulation instead of sentencing en-
trapment.'9
B. Sentencing Manipulation
Whereas sentencing entrapment focuses on the defendant's pre-
disposition, sentencing manipulation focuses on the government's
conduct. A sentencing manipulation claim asserts that a defendant
should not be sentenced as heavily as strict adherence to the Guide-
lines would otherwise require because the government acted outra-
geously or improperly for the sole purpose of increasing the defen-
87 See id. at 1105; see also supra notes 66-67 and accompanying text.
88 See United States v. Stavig, 80 F.3d 1241, 1245 (8th Cir. 1996) ("[W]e have yet to
find that sentencing entrapment existed under the facts of a particular case.").
See United States v. Markovic, 911 F.2d 613, 616 (1lth Cir. 1990) ("Entrapment
as a matter of law is no longer a viable defense in this Circuit.").
90 See United States v. Steelman, No. 95-5308, 1996 U.S. App. LEXIS 24836, at *2
(4th Cir. Sept. 23, 1996) ("This Court has never explicitly recognized the availability of
these theories and does not do so now."); United States v. Lacey, 86 F.3d 956, 963 n.4
(10th Cir.) (indicating that the defense has been raised in the Tenth Circuit but not
directly addressed), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 331 (1996); United States v. Perez,
CRIM.A.Nos. 94-0192-01 & 94-0192-10, 1996 WL 502292, at *6 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 27, 1996)
("Our Court of Appeals has not as yet addressed the theory of sentencing entrap-
ment."); United States v. Knecht, 55 F.3d 54, 57 (2d Cir. 1995) ("The validity of the
concept of sentencing entrapment has not been determined in this circuit."); United
States v. Wright, 48 F.3d 1220 (6th Cir. 1995) (table), No. 93-4228, 1995 WL 101300, at
*2 ("This court has not decided whether, under the Guidelines, sentencing entrap-
ment may be a basis for a downward departure."); United States v. Washington, 44
F.3d 1271, 1280 (5th Cir. 1995) ("Until now, however, we have not had occasion to
address the viability of [a sentencing entrapment defense], and we conclude that we
need not do so today.").
91 See United States v. Schweihs, 83 F.3d 424 (7th Cir. 1996) (table), No. 95-1974,
1996 WL 218200, at *5; United States v. Villegas, 51 F.3d 264 (1st Cir. 1995) (table),
No. 94-1769, 1995 WL 138498, at *2 n.1.
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dant's sentence.2 United States v. Cannon,93 the case discussed in the
introduction to this Comment, is an example of a sentencing manipu-
lation claim. In Cannon, the defendants bought several handguns
from an undercover agent.94 The undercover agent planned to arrest
the defendants after their last meeting. The district court found that
while the defendants had never before asked to buy a machine gun,
the agent brought one to the final meeting and encouraged the de-
fendants to buy the machine gun knowing that, if the defendants
took the bait, the machine gun would add twenty-five years to their
sentences.95
No court of appeals has departed downward on the basis of a sen-
tencing manipulation claim.96 Nonetheless, the First, Sixth, Eighth
and Tenth Circuits have to one degree or another recognized some
form of sentencing manipulation as a valid defense.97 The Seventh
See United States v. Garcia, 79 F.3d 74, 75 (7th Cir. 1996) ("Sentencing manipu-
lation occurs when the government engages in improper conduct that has the effect
of increasing a defendant's sentence."), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 158 (1996); United
States v.Jones, 18 F.3d 1145, 1153 (4th Cir. 1994) ("Citing the First Circuit's opinion
in [United States v.] Connell [960 F.2d 191 (1st Cir. 1992)], the Eighth Circuit adopted
the term 'sentence manipulation' for the theory that outrageous government conduct
that offends due process couldjustify a reduced sentence.").
9s United States v. Cannon, 886 F. Supp. 705 (D.N.D. 1995), re'd, 88 F.3d 1495
(8th Cir. 1996).
94 See id. at 706.
95 See id. at 708-09.
See Fisher, supra note 59, at 2406 ("No court that views sentence manipulation as
a species of outrageous government conduct has allowed the doctrine to provide a
successful partial defense to a quantity-based sentence."). Fisher notes that, of the cir-
cuits that have applied a constitutional standard to sentencing manipulation, only one
court, the district court in Cannon, has reduced a defendant's sentence based on a
sentencing manipulation claim. See id. at 2406 n.108. But even that reduction was not
ultimately successful. The case was reversed and remanded for a new trial due to
prosecutorial misconduct. See Cannon, 88 F.3d at 1509. While the Eighth Circuit
stated that it did not have to reach the question, see id. at 1503, the court indicated
that it found no evidence of outrageous conduct by the government agents, see id. at
1507, and then remanded for a new trial consistent with its opinion, see id. at 1510.
97 See United States v. Brown, No. 94-1139, 1996 WL 283313, at *2 (1st Cir. Mar. 4,
1996) ("This [sentencing manipulation] claim has been recognized as theoretically
valid, but has never been used in this circuit to reduce a defendant's sentence."
(citations omitted)); United States v. Lacey, 86 F.3d 956, 963 (10th Cir. 1996) (stating
that the Tenth Circuit has not directly addressed the sentencing manipulation issue,
but that the outrageous governmental conduct defense is similar, and that that de-
fense allows "sufficiently egregious government conduct" to "affect the sentencing de-
termination"); United States v. Shipley, No. 95-1036, 1995 WL 442209, at *1 (8th Cir.
July 27, 1995) ("A district court may depart downward under the Guidelines based on
sentencing entrapment or sentencing manipulation."); United States v. Sivils, 960 F.2d
587, 598-99 (6th Cir. 1992) ("If Jordan could demonstrate that the government ma-
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and Eleventh Circuits have rejected the defense," while the remain-
ing circuits have not yet addressed the issue."
C. Avoiding Confusion: Sentencing Entrapment and Sentencing
Manipulation Distinguished
These two defenses are easily confused. The confusion occurs
largely because the same conduct can be viewed as either sentencing
entrapment or sentencing manipulation. Take, for example, the
conduct in United States v. Shepherd, discussed earlier.'°° In that case,
the defendant intended to sell powder cocaine but was induced to
convert it to crack.'0' Although the district court opinion did not in-
dicate whether the defendant had argued sentencing entrapment or
sentencing manipulation, the court did indicate, however, that both
nipulated the dollar amount of cocaine to increase his sentence, such manipulation
would certainly provide a fundamental fairness defense against the higher sentence.").
90 See Cotts v. United States, No. 95-2100, 1996 WL 397444, at *1 (7th Cir. July 11,
1996) ("The defense of sentencing manipulation is a dead letter in this circuit."). The
Eleventh Circuit's rejection of sentencing manipulation is less clear. In United States v.
Miller, after noting the Eleventh Circuit's rejection of both the traditional entrapment
defense and the sentencing entrapment defense, the court remarked that while the
defendant argued that "there exists a distinction between sentencing entrapment and
manipulation" the court could "see no difference in this context between entrapment
and manipulation." See United States v. Miller, 71 F.3d 813, 818 & n.2 (11th Cir.
1996). The court did, of course, leave open the possibility that in a different context it
might distinguish sentencing entrapment and sentencing manipulation. See id. at 818.
But even if it did distinguish between the two sentencing defenses, after having re-
jected both the traditional entrapment defense and the sentencing entrapment de-
fense, it is highly unlikely that the Eleventh Circuit would recognize sentencing ma-
nipulation.
99 See United States v. Gomez, 103 F.3d 249, 256 (2d Cir. 1997) ("The status of sen-
tencing manipulation in this circuit is unclear... We need not decide today whether
we recognize such a defense."); United States v. Kaczmarski, 939 F. Supp 1176, 1181
(E.D. Pa. 1996) (allowing a sentencing manipulation defense while noting that "[o]ur
court of appeals has not addressed whether the sentencing factor manipulation doc-
trine ... is a viable one"); United States v. Moore, No. 95-5885, 1996 WL 452423, at *4
(4th Cir. Aug. 12, 1996) (stating that "[t] his court has not decided whether sentencing
manipulation can everjustify a downward departure" but noting that it would require
proof of outrageous conduct); United States v. Tremelling, 43 F.3d 148, 151 (5th Cir.
1995) ("[T]his court apparently has not expressly determined whether we have ac-
cepted the concept of 'sentencing factor manipulation.'"); United States v. Mitchell,
No. 95-50583, 1996 WL 673867, at *2 (9th Cir. Nov. 7, 1996) ("Even if sentence ma-
nipulation is a viable doctrine, a question we do not decide, this court has rejected the
claim that sentencing manipulation occurs whenever the government... opts ... in
favor of continuing its investigation.").
100 857 F. Supp. 105 (D.D.C. 1994); see also supra notes 7081 and accompanying
text.
101 See id. at 106.
1375
1376 UNIVERSITY OFPENNSYLVANIA LAWREVIEW [Vol. 145:1359
defenses were implicated in the case. 11 The court believed the de-
fendant could have argued for either one. In a sentencing entrap-
ment claim, the defendant would have argued that she was predis-
posed only to sell powdered cocaine and not crack. Her sentence,
therefore, should have been based on the type of drug she intended
to sell, not the type she was entrapped into selling. In a sentencing
manipulation claim, the defendant would have argued that the un-
dercover agent had acted improperly by pressuring her to sell a type
of drug she had not been inclined to sell when the sole reason for do-
ing so was to increase her sentence. The overlap of the two doctrines
is clearly seen in the court's own language. The court wrote:
The defendant, though predisposed to sell cocaine, was asked to cook
the cocaine for the sole purpose of increasing her resulting sentence.
Under such circumstances, this conduct is specifically designed to ma-
nipulate the sentence received by undermining the defendant's due
process rights. This purpose and practice must be viewed as outrageous.
Thus, both doctrines are implicated.103
This Comment, however, will distinguish the two defenses. Sen-
tencing entrapment will refer to a claim based upon the defendant's
lack of predisposition. Sentencing manipulation will refer to a claim
based upon police misconduct.
III. THE LEGAL THEORY OF SENTENCING ENTRAPMENT AND
SENTENCING MANIPULATION
While the courts have spent time explaining the need for the de-
fenses and developing the terminology for the defenses, the courts
have spent little time explaining each defense's underlying legal the-
ory. The courts either remain silent or offer differing explanations."M
102 See id. at 111.
103 Id.
104 See, e.g., United States v. Lacey, 86 F.Sd 956, 962 (10th Cir. 1996) (suggesting
sentencing manipulating should be considered under the "outrageous governmental
conduct" standard but failing to explicitly adopt a sentencing manipulation defense);
United States v. Egemonye, 62 F.3d 425, 426 (1st Cir. 1995) (stating that "where gov-
ernment agents have improperly enlarged the scope or scale of the crime, the sen-
tencing court has power to exclude the tainted transaction" but offering no explana-
tion regarding the legal basis for that standard (internal quotations omitted)); United
States v. Barth, 990 F.2d 422, 424-25 (8th 1993) (holding that "sentencing entrapment
may be legally relied upon to depart under the sentencing guidelines" but failing to
explain the legal theory which allows such a departure); United States v. Shepherd,
857 F. Supp. 105, 111, 112 (D.D.C. 1994) (granting a downward departure because the
government conduct had "undermin[ed] the defendant's due process rights"--
suggesting a constitutional basis for the departure-and because "the Judici-
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Since both sentencing defenses make claims similar to the traditional
entrapment defense, this Comment begins the search for an underly-
ing legal justification by examining the development of the tradi-
tional entrapment defense. An understanding of the legal authority
on which the traditional entrapment defense was based may elucidate
a court's present authority to establish new but similar defenses. Ul-
timately, this Comment concludes that the theories offered to support
the traditional entrapment defense do not support the adoption of
either sentencing manipulation or sentencing entrapment defenses.
A. Legal Underpinnings of the Entrapment Defense-Precursor to Sentencing
Entrapment and Sentencing Manipulation
While the entrapment defense is now thoroughly accepted, 0 5 the
Supreme Court's authority to adopt the traditional entrapment de-
fense has been debated since the defense was first established.0 6 The
Supreme Court first recognized the entrapment defense in Sorrells v.
United States. 7 In that case, a prohibition agent and a friend of Sor-
ary... stand[s] as a bulwark against overreaching by law enforcement"-suggesting
the court's supervisory authority as grounds for departure); see also United States v.
Jones, 18 F.3d 1145, 1154 & n.12 (4th Cir. 1994) (stating that the Fourth Circuit has
not addressed the legal viability of sentencing entrapment and expressing no opinion
as to whether Application Note 17 of the Sentencing Guidelines (Application Note 15
in the 1995 version of the Guidelines) accounts for the theories of sentencing manipu-
lation and sentencing entrapment); United States v. Staufer, 38 F.3d 1103, 1107 (9th
Cir. 1994) (basing a sentencing entrapment claim on Application Note 15). Applica-
tion Note 15 is discussed in detail, infra, Part III.D.1.
105 See Sara Sun Beale, Reconsidering Supervisory Power in Criminal Cases: Constitu-
tional and Statutory Limits on the Authority of the Federal Courts, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1433,
1519 (1984) ("Perhaps the entrapment defense itself has been legitimated by four
decades of congressional acquiescence.");Jonathan C. Carlson, The Act Requirement and
the Foundations of the Entrapment Defense 73 VA. L. REV. 1011, 1013 (1987) ("[S]ome ver-
sion of the entrapment defense has been created by legislation or judicial decision in
all fifty states.").
106 See Fred Warren Bennett, From Sorrells tojacobson: Reflections on Six Decades of
Entrapment Law, and Related Defenses, in Federal Court, 27 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 829, 833
(1992) (noting that United States v. Sorrells, 287 U.S. 435 (1932), the first Supreme
Court case to adopt the entrapment defense, "sparked a heated debate" regarding the
foundations of the entrapment defense); Carlson, supra note 105, at 1013 ("Courts
and commentators still disagree over certain basic issues regarding the entrapment
defense, including the reason for creating the defense ... and even whether the de-
fense is part of the law of criminal procedure or the substantive criminal law."); Nancy
Y.T. Hanewicz, Note, Jacobson v. United States: The Entrapment Defense and Judicial Su-
pervision of the Criminal Justice System, 1993 WIS. L. REv. 1163, 1168 ("In all four
[entrapment cases], the issue of the Court's authority to create the entrapment de-
fense was pivotal.").
107 287 U.S. 435 (1932).
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rells went to Sorrells's home where the agent introduced himself as a
furniture salesman.' 8 During the conversation that followed, the
agent asked Sorrells if Sorrells could supply him with liquor.'O° At
first, Sorrells told the agent that he "'did not fool with whiskey.'""0
But after further requests, Sorrells left and returned some time later
with the liquor."' The agent paid Sorrells five dollars for the liquor.
'2
Eight of the nine Justices ruled that Sorrells had been en-
trapped." s Those eightJustices split five to three, however, regarding
the definition of entrapment and the basis for the Court's authority
to establish the defense."1
4
1. The Majority Approach: Legislative Intent Underlies the
Entrapment Defense
The Sorrells majority found entrapment because Sorrells had not
been predisposed to sell liquor."5 The Court found that "the defen-
dant had no previous disposition to commit [the offense] but was an
industrious, law-abiding citizen, and that the agent lured defendant,
otherwise innocent, to [commit the offense] by repeated and persis-
tent solicitation." 6 Thus the majority looked at the intentions of the
defendant, found that absent the government conduct the defendant
would not have committed the crime, and declared him entrapped.
This approach, which bases a defendant's access to the entrapment
defense upon the defendant's state of mind, is called the "subjective"
approach."
7
In finding that the defendant was entrapped, and therefore im-
mune from prosecution, the majority was careful to explain that it was
108 See id. at 440.
109 See id. at 439. The number of times the agent asked for liquor was never clearly
established. See id.110 Id. at 440.
I See id. at 439-40 (contrasting the government's claim that the defendant left his
home and came back after "a few minutes," with defense witnesses who stated that the
trip took "twenty to thirty minutes").
112 See id. at 439.
11 See id. at 453, 459.
14 See id. at 441 ("[B]ut the question whether [the agent's conduct] precludes
prosecution... [and] upon what theory, has given rise to conflicting opinion.").
"5 See id.
116 Id.
1 See Bennett, supra note 106, at 834 ("The subjective test of entrap-
ment... focuses exclusively on the defendant's predisposition . . . ."); Hanewicz, supra
note 106, at 1177-78 ("The [majority] approach is labelled 'subjective' because it cen-
ters upon the state of mind (or predisposition) of the defendant.").
DEFENDING A SENTENCE
not undoing legislation"8 or putting forth new public policy. " Both
functions would be outside the domain of the judiciary. Rather, the
majority kept to the traditional function of the judiciary, which is to
construe statutes as they are written by the legislature. 20 The majority
claimed that the legislature did not intend that an "otherwise inno-
cent" defendant should be prosecuted.2 2 By narrowly construing the
legislative intent, the majority excluded the defendant from the im-
pact of the statute. In the decades that followed the Sorrells decision,
in Sherman v. United States,'22United States v. Russells and Jacobson v.
United States, the Supreme Court consistently upheld the subjective
approach and its foundation in legislative intent.
2. Criticism of the Majority Approach
Criticism of the subjective approach began the moment the Sor-
rells decision was decided. In his concurring opinion in Sorrells, Jus-
tice Roberts described the majority decision as "strained and unwar-
ranted. "'2s Since then, critics of the subjective approach have
questioned whether in fact Congress intended to exclude non-
predisposed defendants from the scope of all criminal statutes.
2
6 Jus-
11 See Sorrels, 287 U.S. at 450 ("Judicial nullification of statutes, admittedly valid
and applicable, has, happily, no place in our system.").
See id. at 445-46 ("To the suggestion of public policy the objectors answer that
the legislature, acting within its constitutional authority, is the arbiter of public policy
and that, where conduct is expressly forbidden and penalized by a valid statute, the
courts are not at liberty to disregard the law and to bar a prosecution .... It is mani-
fest that these arguments rest entirely upon the letter of the statute." (citation omit-
ted)).
12 See id. at 450 ("We conceive it to be our duty to construe the statute here in
question reasonably, and we hold that it is beyond our prerogative to give the statute
an unreasonable construction ....").
1 See id. at 448 (stating that the Court was "unable to conclude that it was the in-
tention of the Congress in enacting this statute that its processes of detection and en-
forcement should be abused" for the purpose of luring someone "otherwise innocent"
to the commission of a crime).
l2 356 U.S. 369, 372-73 (1958) ("The principles by which the courts are to make
this determination [whether entrapment has been established] were outlined in Sor-
rells.").
12 411 U.S. 423, 433 (1973) ("This Court's opinions in Sorreds... and Sher-
man... held that the principal element in the defense of entrapment was the defen-
dant's predisposition to commit the crime.... We decline to overrule these cases.").
124 503 U.S. 540, 549 n.2 (1992) (upholding the subjective approach). But see
Hanewicz, supra note 106, at 1166 (claiming that the Jacobson decision supported Sor-
rells in name only while actually applying objective criteria).
12 Sorrells, 287 U.S. at 456 (Roberts,J., concurring).
126 Commentators have also criticized the subjective approach because the proof
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tice Frankfurter in his concurring opinion in Sherman argued that the
only possible intention one could draw from the statute was that the
legislature intended to criminalize exactly the conduct in which the
entrapped defendant had engaged. He explained that "[a] statute
prohibiting the sale of narcotics is as silent on the issue of entrap-
ment as it is on the admissibility of illegally obtained evidence." 21 He
concluded that the Sorrells finding of a legislative intent was "sheer fic-
tion."29 Commentators since have followed suit 5 0
3. The Minority Approach: Supervisory Authority Permits the
Adoption of the Entrapment Defense
Legislative intent is not the only rationale offered to support the
entrapment defense. A persistent minority on the Supreme Court
has defined and rationalized the entrapment defense differently. In
his concurring opinion in Sorrells, Justice Roberts asserted that the
true purpose of the entrapment defense is to discourage indecent po-
lice practices.'3' This view of the entrapment defense is called the
"objective" approach. The objective approach examines only the
conduct of law enforcement and ignores the state of mind of the de-
fendant.3 2 If the police activity would have induced an average law-
of non-predisposition rests on the defendant's reputation and prior behavior rather
than the facts of the case. See, e.g., Sorrells, 287 U.S. at 459 (Roberts, J., concurring)
("The [subjective approach] ... pivots conviction in such cases, not on the commis-
sion of the crime charged, but on the prior reputation... of the defendant."); Carl-
son, supra note 105, at 1039 (arguing that the subjective approach "authorizes an
'open season' on any person who could be shown in a court of law-through proof of
prior crimes.., bad reputation, or... bad character-to have a propensity to engage
in crime"). This criticism, which does not attack the validity of the foundation of the
defense, is outside the scope of this Comment.
127 See Sherman, 356 U.S. at 379 (Frankfurter, J., concurring in the result).
128 Id. at 381.
129 Id. at 379.
ISO See, e.g., United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 442 (1973) (Stewartj., dissent-
ing) ("The very fact that he has committed [the crime] demonstrates conclusively that
he is not innocent of the offense."); PAUL MARCUS, THE ENTRAPMENT DEFENSE 65
(1989) ("Could there be a Congressional 'state of mind' on a silent issue?"); Carlson,
supra note 105, at 1019 ("An entrapped defendant, after all, has acted in a manner
deemed criminal by the legislature. This fact would appear to provide ample reason
to incarcerate him.").
1 See Sosrells, 287 U.S. at 454-55 ("There is common agreement that where a law
officer envisages a crime, plans it, and activates its commission ... the consummation
of so revolting a plan ought not to be permitted by any self respecting tribunal....
Public policy forbids such sacrifice of decency.").
1 See Bennett, supra note 106, at 837 ("[T]he objective test focuses exclusively on
the actions taken by law enforcement. :. ."); Hanewicz, supra note 106, at 1178 ("The
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abiding citizen to commit the crime, then the defendant is said to be
entrapped and cannot be prosecuted."" As Justice Frankfurter ex-
plained in his concurring opinion in Sherman, "[t]he crucial ques-
tion... is whether the police conduct... falls below standards, to
which common feelings respond, for the proper use of governmental
power."o
3 4
In Sorrells and its progeny, the minority based its entrapment de-
fense on the right of the Court to preserve its own integrity.35 At the
time of Sormells, the Court was still arguing over the extent of its
authority to control the administration of criminal justice in the
courts.' 6 In 1943, however, in McNabb v. United States, 3 7 the Supreme
Court announced that one of the inherent powers of the judiciary is
to "establish[] and maintain[] civilized standards of procedure and
evidence."' ss This authority would come to be known as the Court's
supervisory authority. Hence, by the time Sherman was decided in
1958, the Court had already established that the Court's supervisory
authority encompassed the ability to apply "proper standards for the
enforcement of federal criminal law in the federal courts." 9 Thus,
the minority was able to rely explicitly on the Court's supervisory
authority to justify the entrapment defense. 40 Since Sherman, the mi-
objective approach ... regards entrapment as a means of controlling police conduct
without reliance on the character of the defendant.").
133 Bennett, supra note 106, at 836 ("According to the objective test, if the method
of encouragement used was likely to induce an ordinary law-abiding citizen to commit
the offense, then the case should be dismissed."); Hanewicz, supra note 106, at 1179
("If the seductions offered by the government would have induced a reasonable, law-
abiding citizen to commit the crime, the defendant should be acquitted. . .
'34 Sherman, 356 U.S. at 382.
,35 See, e.g., SonrelA, 287 U.S. at 457 (Roberts, J., concurring) ("The [entrapment]
doctrine rests ... on a fundamental rule of public policy. The protection of [a
court's] own functions and the preservation of the purity of its own temple belong
only to the court.").
See Carlson, supra note 105, at 1026 ("At the time of the Sorrells case, the Court
was preoccupied with a dispute over the Court's power to control the general admini-
stration of criminal justice in the federal courts.").
137 318 U.S. 332 (1943).
138 Id. at 340; see also Beale, supra note 105, at 1435 ("McNabb v. United States... is
generally regarded as the first supervisory power decision."); Hanewicz, supra note 106,
at 1166 ("Entrapment was adopted by the Supreme Court before the Court articulated
its doctrine ofjudicial supervision." (citation omitted)).
139 McNabb, 318 U.S. at 341.
140 SeeSherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369, 380 (1958) (Frankfurter, J., concur-
ring in the result) (describing the federal courts' obligation to "set their face against
enforcement of the law by lawless means" and citing McNabb as its authority). Other
proponents draw on the same language Justice Brandeis used in Casey v. United States,
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nority view which supports the objective defense has relied on the
Court's authority to uphold proper standards.
4 '
4. Criticism of the Minority Approach
The objective approach, however, has not escaped criticism.
Criticism of the objective approach rests largely on whether the Court
in fact possesses its self-declared supervisory authority. The Court
first established its supervisory authority in McNabb v. United States. '
There, the Supreme Court excluded two murder confessions after the
defendants were held for two days and repeatedly questioned without
any contact with family, friends or counsel. '4 Holding the defendants
for two days was contrary to federal law which required that the men
be arraigned promptly.'" The fact that the police had failed to ar-
raign the men, however, should not have been grounds for excluding
the confessions. As the dissent indicated, prior to McNabb, a confes-
sion was admissible so long as it was given voluntarily.45 In fact, the
majority admitted that the use of confessions obtained in this manner
was not contrary to law.1
6
Nevertheless, the McNabb Court excluded the confessions on the
basis that, were the Court to admit the evidence, the Court would be-
276 U.S. 413, 425 (1928), to argue for the Court's supervisory authority to support the
entrapment defense. SeeUnited States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 442-43 (1973) (Stewart,
J., dissenting) (citing Brandeis's argument that a prosecution should be stopped "in
order to protect the Government. To protect it from illegal conduct of its officers. To
preserve the purity of its courts."); see also Beale, supra note 105, at 1443 (describing
Justice Brandeis's arguments supporting the court's supervisory authority); Note, The
Judge-Made Supervisoiy Power of the Federal Courts, 53 GEO. LJ. 1050, 1067-69 (1965)
[hereinafter Judge-Made Supervisory Power] (noting the minority's reliance on the
Court's supervisory authority as a basis for the entrapment defense).
141 See Russe, 411 U.S. at 442-43 (Stewart, J., dissenting) (arguing that the purpose
of the entrapment defense is to "prohibit unlawful governmental activity.., and to
preserve the purity of [the] courts" (internal quotations omitted)).
142 318 U.S. 332 (1943).
14 See id. at 341 ("Quite apart from the Constitution, therefore, we are constrained
to hold that the evidence elicited from the petitioners in the circumstances disclosed
here must be excluded.").
144 See id. at 341-44 (pointing to a variety of federal and state statutes "requiring
that the police must with reasonable promptness show legal cause for detaining ar-
rested persons").
145 See id. at 348 (Reed, J., dissenting) ("Statements made while under interroga-
tion may be used at a trial if it may fairly be said that the information was given volun-
tarily.).
See id. at 345-46 ("[W]e have no specific provisions of law governing federal law
enforcement officers in procuring evidence from persons held in custody.").
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come an "accomplice[] in willful disobedience of the law."147 The
Court, one commentator noted, believed that it had a "duty to pre-
vent such corruption of the federal judiciary" through the use of
tainted evidence. 48  Thus, beginning with McNabb and in cases that
followed, the Supreme Court's supervisory authority has included the
Court's right to regulate and modify improper police behavior.'
4 9
Some commentators have argued that the Court's authority to
regulate police conduct has no valid legal foundation.50 All federal
courts are courts of limited jurisdiction. 15' Thus a federal court's
authority must be derived from the Constitution, a statute-such as a
rules enabling act-or inherent powers of a court." Examining these
sources one by one, these commentators conclude that the Court's
supervisory authority has no legitimate source. First, they argue,
"Article III of the federal constitution contains no explicit grant of
supervisory jurisdiction."5  And certainly, the Constitution does not
direct the judiciary to oversee the conduct of the executive branch.'5
As for statutes, Congress has passed several rules enabling acts which
147 Id. at 345.
48 Judge-Made Superuisoy Power, supra note 140, at 1064.
See Office of Legal Policy, Department ofJustice, Report to the Attorney General on
theJudiciary's Use of Supervisory Power to Control Federal Law Enforcement Activity, 'Truth in
Criminal Justice' Report No. 5, 22 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 773, 795 n.62 (1989)
[hereinafter Report to the Attorney General] (listing cases in which the courts have used
their supervisory authority to exclude evidence tainted by law enforcement's out-of-
court misconduct).
15o Judge-Made Supervisory Power, supra note 140, at 1077 (stating that the founda-
tions of a court's supervisory power "cannot confidently be traced to any identifiable
source").
151 See Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Transport Workers Union, 451 U.S. 77, 95 (1981)
("[F]ederal courts, unlike their state counterparts, are courts of limited jurisdiction
that have not been vested with open-ended lawmaking powers.").
152 See Beale, supra note 105, at 1506 (considering the potential sources of power of
the courts as deriving from the Constitution, federal statute, areas of special judicial
competence, and their authority to create federal common law); Report to the Attorney
Genera4 supra note 149, at 785-86 ("If the federal judiciary has any supervisory author-
ity, this authority must have its source either in the Constitution or in Act of Con-
gress.... [The only remaining source of power is an] inherent or implied aspect of
Article III."); Judge-Made Supervisory Power, supra note 140, at 1051 (listing the same
three sources of a court's authority).
Judge-Made Supervisory Power, supra note 140, at 1051.
SeeReport to the Attorney General supra note 149, at 785 ("[N]either Article III nor
any other provision of the Constitution expressly authorizes the courts to oversee the
administration ofjustice in the federal system ... ."); id. at 816 ("[The imposition of
judicially fashioned standards for the conduct of investigations is but an unwarranted
arrogation of the power entrusted by the Constitution to the legislative and executive
branches.").
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allow the Court to establish rules of procedure. 5 These enabling acts
permit the Court to promulgate standardized, written rules. The
enabling acts do not, however, grant the Court the power to establish
new rules on a case-by-case basis. 1 6 For example, the exclusionary
rule established in McNabb falls outside the province of any rules ena-
bling act because it arose from the specific facts of a particular case
rather than from a standardized rulemaking process that Congress
had authorized.
The only other prong upon which the Court's supervisory author-
ity might rest is its inherent or implied powers. The Court's inherent
powers are those that are necessary for the Court to function.5 7 His-
tory contradicts the argument that rulemaking is necessary for the
Court to function. Beginning with the Judiciary Act in 1789, Con-
gress regulated courtroom procedure.'58 Thus, Congress viewed for-
mulating rules of procedure as a legislative function.'59 And, signifi-
cantly, so did the Supreme Court. In an early opinion upholding the
adoption of a procedural rule by a federal district court, the Supreme
Court held the adoption valid only because Congress had delegated
its authority to the federal courts.' 6 Thus, neither Congress nor the
Court viewed the authority to establish procedural rules as inherent
to the judiciary.
A less extreme criticism accepts a limited recognition of the
Court's supervisory authority but denies that the Court's supervisory
authority extends to regulating out-of-court police conduct. A limited
155 See, e.g., Rules Enabling Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-415, 48 Stat. 1064 (current
version at 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1994)); see also Judge-Made Supervisory Power, supra note 140,
at 1051 (noting that the Enabling Act of 1934 authorized the Supreme Court to
promulgate the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure).
15 See Report to the Attorney General, supra note 149, at 785 ("Congress has never
empowered the judiciary to exercise [supervisory) authority."); Judge-Made Supervisory
Power, supra note 140, at 1051 (arguing that the mere fact that some state supreme
courts have the power to establish new rules on a case-by-case basis does not mean that
federal courts can also do so).
157 See Report to the Attorney Genera4 supra note 149, at 788 ("[C]ourts must have cer-
tain powers if they are to function as courts.");Judge-Made Supervisory Power, supra note
140, at 1052 ("Inherent power has been defined as that which is essential to the exis-
tence, dignity and functions of the court as a constitutional tribunal and from the very
fact that it is a court .... " (internal quotations omitted)).
in Judiciary Act, Sept. 24, 1789, 1 Stat. 73 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 3041
(1994)).
159 See Report to the Attorney General, supra note 149, at 787 (arguing that establishing
rules and procedures is not "inherently and exclusively ajudicial function").
16D SeeWayman v. Southard, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 1, 14-15 (1825) (cited in Report to
the Attorney Genera4 supra note 149, at 787).
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recognition of the Court's supervisory authority rests on the Court's
implied powers and time. It acknowledges that "it is helpful and in
some instances necessary" for the Court to adopt procedural rules. 6 '
Furthermore, the Court's "special competence in dealing with techni-
cal matters of the litigation process" makes it best suited to formulate
these necessary rules.6 6 Time also validates the Court's use of its su-
pervisory authority. In the fifty-three years since McNabb, the Su-
preme Court has been using supervisory authority as a basis of opin-
ion. In only two instances has Congress acted to overrule the
Supreme Court.6 If only through time and acquiescence, the
Courts' use of supervisory authority has gained legitimacy'
64
This limited recognition of the Court's supervisory authority does
not, however, countenance the adoption of rules that regulate the
conduct of law enforcement outside the courtroom. 6' Such rules ex-
ceed the scope of the Court's supervisory authority. The Court's
"special competence regarding technical matters of judicial admini-
stration provides no justification" for regulating out-of-court con-
duct0 6  Recently, the Supreme Court has recognized this limited in-
terpretation of the Court's supervisory authority. In its 1992 decision
United States v. Williams, the Supreme Court held that a court's super-
visory authority should not be used to dictate prosecutorial conduct
outside the courtroom. 67
161 Beale, supra note 105, at 1475.
162 Id.
163 See id. at 1454. One commentator suggests that rulemaking authority has tradi-
tionally been a shared function, not the sole prerogative of the legislature. See Judge-
Made Supervisory Power supra note 140, at 1054 ("[T]he argument over who had the
power to adopt uniform rules of procedure for the district courts was resolved prag-
matically by co-action of the legislature and the judiciary....").
:' SeeJudge-Made Supervisory Power, supra note 140, at 1056.
Z See Beale, supra note 105, at 1494 ("Although many supervisory power decisions
fit comfortably within the scope of the [federal courts'] authority .... other deci-
sions ... cannot be so justified."); Judge-Made Supervisory Power, supra note 140, at 1077
("Some of the supervisory power decisions... [are] fairly compatible with traditional
notions ofjudicial power .... But other recent applications of supervisory power, no-
tably the jury composition cases and the McNabb line of cases, represent a distinct de-
parture from what courts have traditionally done. Moreover,... the authority for the
latter type cannot confidently be traced to any identifiable source.").
16 Beale, supra note 105, at 1494.
167 See United States v. Williams, 504 U.S. 36, 46-47 (1992) ("We did not
hold.., that the courts' supervisory power could be used, not merely as a means of
enforcing or vindicating legally compelled standards of prosecutorial conduct ... but
as a means of prescribing those standards of prosecutorial conduct in the first in-
stance-just as it may be used as a means of establishing standards of prosecutorial
conduct before the courts themselves.").
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Whether the criticisms are levied against the subjective or objec-
tive versions of the entrapment defense, the Court's original authority
to establish the defense was questionable. The subjective entrapment
defense derives from a legislative intent that may or may not have ex-
isted. The objective entrapment defense relies on the Court's super-
visory authority, which may not extend to the creation of rules regu-
lating the executive branch. These questions regarding the Court's
authority to establish the entrapment defenses are equally applicable
to a lower court's authority to establish a sentencing defense. Before
turning to the question of a lower court's authority to establish sen-
tencing defenses, however, another defense-one related to the ob-
jective entrapment defense-must be considered.
B. Outrageous Government Conduct: A Constitutional Defense
While the objective approach has never garnered enough votes
on the Court to supersede the subjective approach, it did give rise to a
similar defense whose legal validity is not questioned. In 1973, in
United States v. Russell,' the Court refused to recognize the objective
approach, but acknowledged that "we may some day be presented
with a situation in which the conduct of law enforcement agents is so
outrageous that due process principles would absolutely bar the gov-
ernment from invoking judicial processes to obtain a conviction."
6 9
The "outrageous government conduct" defense is similar to the
objective entrapment defense in that it focuses on the conduct of law
enforcement agents. 70 The most significant difference, however, is
that the outrageous government conduct defense is grounded in the
Constitution whereas the objective entrapment defense is grounded
in the Court's supervisory authority.'7
C. SentencingEntrapment and Sentencing Manipulation: Following in the
Footsteps of Entrapment
Sentencing entrapment and sentencing manipulation parallel the
168 411 U.S. 423 (1973).
16 Id. at 431-32.
170 See Bennett, supra note 106, at 858 ("[T)he defense of outrageous governmen-
tal conduct focuses exclusively on the government's actions.").
1 See id. ("[T]he due process defense of outrageous governmental conduct is one
of constitutional dimension.").
17 See supra notes 132-41 and accompanying text.
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theories underlying the entrapment defense.'n Sentencing entrap-
ment follows the path laid out by the subjective entrapment defense.
The subjective entrapment defense claims that because the defendant
lacked a predisposition to commit the crime, she should not be
prosecuted. Sentencing entrapment admits that the defendant was
predisposed to commit a criminal act but denies that the defendant
was predisposed to commit as serious a crime as the one with which
she is now being charged. Both defenses rely on the defendant's state
of mind-one to justify eliminating punishment, the other to mitigate
it.
Sentencing manipulation follows the objective entrapment de-
fense and the outrageous government conduct defense. Both the ob-
jective entrapment defense and the outrageous government conduct
defense protect a defendant from prosecution in the event of police
misconduct. Similarly, sentencing manipulation focuses on police
misconduct as a rationale for mitigating a defendant's sentence.
Some courts recognizing sentencing manipulation have followed the
constitutional standard outlined in Russell and required outrageous
government conduct to justify a downward departure at sentencing 74
Other courts have required only a showing of improper conduct.',
Presumably, a court adopting the improper conduct standard does so
pursuant to its supervisory authority. 76
The final similarity between the traditional entrapment defense
and the new sentencing defense is that theoretical questions remain
about each defense's proper legal foundations. The difference be-
tween the entrapment defense and the sentencing defenses is that,
despite theoretical questions regarding its legal underpinnings, the
entrapment defense has been accepted for over sixty years.'" Since
1 The sentencing defenses are now following an identical developmental path as
the entrapment defense did fifty years ago. In both instances, political and legal de-
velopments gave rise to abusive police tactics. Where Prohibition preceded the en-
trapment defense, the Federal Sentencing Guidelines preceded the sentencing de-
fenses. Ultimately, the courts became concerned about the tactics and began
considering new defenses. The one difference between the development of the tradi-
tional entrapment defense and the sentencing defenses is that with the traditional en-
trapment defense, the courts were much more explicit about debating their authority
to establish the new defense. No such debate has occurred with sentencing defenses.
174 See infra note 205 and accompanying text.
1 See infra notes 208-10 and accompanying text.
176 See infra note 211 and accompanying text.
'" The subjective approach was adopted by the Supreme Court in United States v.
Sorrels, 287 U.S. 435 (1932). The objective approach has since been adopted by many
states and the Model Penal Code. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.13 (1980); Bennett, su-
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Congress has not acted to restrict or eliminate it, the defense has
gained legitimacy.78 Sentencing defenses, however, have not yet been
legitimated by the passage of time. Sentencing entrapment and sen-
tencing manipulation are still less than a decade old and have not yet
been acknowledged by the Supreme Court. As courts across the
country recognize both sentencing entrapment and sentencing ma-
nipulation, it is appropriate to ask now, at the outset, whether either
defense rests on a solid legal foundation.
D. The Lower Courts'Authority to Adopt Sentencing Entrapment
Sentencing entrapment, which focuses on the defendant's pre-
disposition, follows the subjective approach. The subjective approach
relies on the theory that Congress did not intend to criminalize a
non-predisposed defendant. Thus the validity of sentencing entrap-
ment will rest on the finding of a legislative intent to decrease the
punishment of less culpable defendants. Appropriately, when the
Ninth Circuit in United States v. Staufer granted a downward departure
based on a sentencing entrapment claim, it looked to the Sentencing
Guidelines to support the defense.' This Section will discuss the
Ninth Circuit's interpretation of Application Note 15 to the Sentenc-
ing Guidelines and the difficulty of otherwise using legislative intent
as a basis for a sentencing entrapment defense.
1. Application Note 15180 as a Foundation for Sentencing Entrapment
In United States v. Staufer, described above, the defendant was ar-
rested when he agreed to sell 10,000 doses of LSD when he had
originally offered to sell only 5000 doses.' The Staufer court relied
on Application Note 15 which was added in 1993, one year prior to
Staufer. Application Note 15 reads:
pra note 106, at 835 nn.37 & 38.
178 See Beale, supra note 105, at 1519 ("Perhaps the entrapment defense itself has
been legitimated by four decades of congressional acquiescence.").
179 See United States v. Staufer, 38 F.3d 1103, 1107 (9th Cir. 1994).
ISOThe text of Application Note 15 was first introduced in the 1994 Sentencing
Guidelines Manual as Application Note 17. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL
§ 2D1.1 Application Note 17 (1994). In 1995, however, the same text appears under
Application Note 15. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2D1.1 Application
Note 15 (1995). Some earlier cases or texts may therefore refer to Application Note
17 instead of Application Note 15. See, e.g., United States v.Jones, 18 F.3d 1145, 1154
& n.12 (4th Cir. 1994). The text of the two application notes are identical.
1 See Staufer, 38 F.3d at 1105.
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If, in a reverse sting (an operation in which a government agent sells or
negotiates to sell a controlled substance to a defendant), the court finds
that the government agent set a price for the controlled substance that
was substantially below the market value of the controlled substance,
thereby leading the defendant's purchase of a significantly greater
quantity of the controlled substance than his available resources would
have allowed him to purchase except for the artificially low price set by
the government agent, a downward departure may be warranted.1 2
Application Note 15 does not actually apply to the facts of Staufer.
Application Note 15 requires that the defendant be caught in a re-
verse sting operation. A reverse sting occurs when the government
agent is the seller and the defendant the buyer.'83 Staufer was selling
to, not buying from, an undercover agent. s4 This is a straight sting.
Furthermore, while the court found that the undercover agent of-
fered more money in exchange for more doses of LSD, the court did
not find that the agent had offered an "artificially" high price.'
Nonetheless, by generalizing the language of Application Note
15, the Staufer court found a legislative intent to justify a downward
departure. The Staufer court argued that under Application Note 15,
the Sentencing Commission had "expressly" recognized that govern-
ment agents should not be allowed to structure any undercover op-
erations so as purposely to increase a defendant's sentence. The
court further concluded that Application Note 15 indicated Con-
gress's intent that courts should consider a defendant's predisposition
and capacity to engage in the transaction for which she is being
187charged . The court explained that while the application note re-
ferred to only one type of transaction, the note indicated the Sentenc-
ing Commission's awareness of "the unfairness and arbitrariness" of
undercover agents who pressure defendants in order to increase a de-
fendant's sentence.85
182 U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2D1.1 Application Note 15 (1995).
185 See id.
184 See Staufer, 38 F.3d at 1105.
185 See id. ("There also is evidence that the CI [confidential informant] and Daul
[the undercover agent] immediately offered to pay more money than they initially
had agreed to pay when Staufer expressed reluctance at the larger deal.").
See id. at 1107 ("[T]he Sentencing Commission now expressly recognizes that
law enforcement agents should not be allowed to structure sting operations in such a
way as to maximize the sentences imposed on defendants .... ").
1s7 See id. ("[T]he Sentencing Commission now expressly recognizes that
... courts may take into consideration the predisposition and capacity of the defen-
dant to engage in a deal of the magnitude for which he or she was convicted.").
18 Id.
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The Staufer court gave a broad reading to the application note
that may not be warranted. As the Staufer court recognized, the appli-
cation note refers to only one type of undercover operation-a re-
verse sting. 8 9 The Commission's intentions are unknown since its
drafting sessions are not recorded and the Commission provides no
legislative history."O It is just as plausible, however, that the narrow
language of the application note is due to the fact that either the
Commission has not considered other types of manipulative behavior
or that it has considered other types of manipulative behavior and
expressly limited downward departures to the one practice described
in the note.' One court has interpreted Application Note 15 more
narrowly. In United States v. Stavig,'2 the Eighth Circuit upheld a dis-
trict court's finding that Application Note 15 did not apply because
the defendant "did not receive a larger quantity of cocaine due to a
lower price."9  Rather, the agents fronted drugs for a "favorable"
price.9 4 If one accepts that the Staufer interpretation is overbroad, the
question remains whether courts have the authority to establish a
general sentencing entrapment defense outside the Sentencing
Guidelines.
2. Legislative Intent as a Foundation for Sentencing Entrapment
The establishment of a new sentencing entrapment defense based
on legislative intent is, however, subject to the very criticisms aimed at
the traditional entrapment defense. The traditional entrapment de-
fense, based on legislative intent, is critiqued as "strained and unwar-
ranted" because there is no evidence that Congress intended to ex-
clude from prosecution non-predisposed defendants.' Similarly, no
evidence exists that the Sentencing Commission intended to limit the
scope of punishment because the defendant intended to commit a
189 See id. ("The Sentencing Commission's determination that the defendant may
receive a downward departure when the government artificially lowers the price of the
drugs, however, only addresses one of the ways in which drug enforcement agents are
able to manipulate sentences.").
190 Telephone Interview with Michael Courlander, Public Information Specialist,
United States Sentencing Commission (Apr. 16, 1997).
SeeJohnson, supra note 15, at 218 (stating that if the Commission had intended
to condemn all manipulations, then one would expect the amendment "to have been
written more broadly").
192 80 F.3d 1241 (8th Cir. 1996).
19 Id. at 1246.
194 Id. at 1244.
195 See supra notes 125-30 and accompanying text.
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lesser crime. As such, a sentencing entrapment defense resting on
legislative intent would be equally "strained and unwarranted."
The Commission was not overly concerned that punishment re-
flect a defendant's blameworthiness. If anything, the Sentencing
Commission seemed particularly unconcerned about an individual's
particular culpability or predisposition. As mentioned above, Con-
gress initially recommended that a judge consider, among other
things, a "defendant's... mental and emotional condition .... family
ties and responsibilities, community ties, role in the offense, criminal
history, and dependence upon criminal activity for a livelihood,"'96 as
well as the defendant's intent and purpose in committing the
crime.19 7 The Commission, however, found that only three factors
were relevant to sentencing: (1) a defendant's past criminal history;
(2) her dependence upon the criminal activity for her livelihood; and
(3) her acceptance of responsibility for the crime.98 In 1989, the
Commission deleted the requirement that judges consider a defen-
dant's motives, deeming it "unnecessary."'99 The Sentencing Guide-
lines is a quantity-based sentencing scheme where the subjective
characteristics of the defendant have little if any role to play.29 Claim-
ing that it is the Commission's intent to exclude non-predisposed de-
fendants from the scope of the Sentencing Guidelines would be, once
again, "sheer fiction."2°'
In his concurring opinion in Sorrells, Justice Roberts made a basic
point that is as equally applicable now as it was then. He stated that
the only possible intention one could draw from the criminal statute
196 See Ogletree, supra note 32, at 1953.
197 SeeWeinstein & Bernstein, supra note 33, at 121.
1 See Ogletree, supra note 32, at 1953.
99 See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
209 SeeJohnson, supra note 15, at 205 ("The Guidelines ... make[] harm to society
the determinative factor in sentencing.").
201 Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369, 379 (1958) (FrankfurterJ., concurring
in the result). The Guidelines state that a philosophical question arose whether pun-
ishment should be "scaled to the offender's culpability" or to "deterring others or in-
capacitating the defendant" and claim that no decision between the two philosophies
was made. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL 3 (1995). Nonetheless, the re-
suiting structure of the Guidelines does not allow any consideration for a defendant's
culpability. As the Guidelines explain, "[t] he larger the number of sub-categories of
an offense and offender characteristics included in the guidelines, the greater
the.., number of decisions required... [and] the greater the risk that different
courts would apply the guidelines differently.., thereby reintroducing the very dispar-
ity that the guidelines were designed to reduce." Id. Thus the Guidelines chose to
value similarity in sentences over sentences scaled to a defendant's culpability. See
Johnson, supra note 15, at 206.
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is that the legislature intended to criminalize exactly the conduct the
defendant had engaged in.2 °2 So too here, the only possible intention
that one can draw from the Sentencing Guidelines is that Congress
intended to punish individuals who committed criminal activity. Pun-
ishment is the point of the statute.
The judges and commentators who wish to establish sentencing
entrapment as a defense and escape the punishment otherwise im-
posed by the Sentencing Guidelines are moved by the fact that the
defendant is not truly culpable to the extent to which she is being
punished. If this-punishment uncorrelated to blame-is the ill a
judge wishes to correct, and if the judge wishes to base the defense on
legislative intent, she will have to show that the Commission intended
to correlate punishment to blameworthiness. This is a difficult show-
ing to make.
If sentencing entrapment is nonetheless recognized by the courts,
such as it was in Staufer, and neither the Sentencing Commission nor
Congress moves to overturn it, time may still legitimize the defense.
This, of course, would require the courts to reach beyond their own
authority and claim justification through congressional and adminis-
trative silence.
E. The Courts'Authority to Adopt Sentencing Manipulation
While the sentencing entrapment defense responds to the con-
cern that defendants are being punished disproportionately to their
blameworthiness, the sentencing manipulation defense responds to
the concern that the police are acting improperly. Sentencing ma-
nipulation is thus a descendant of the objective approach, as both
amount to a claim that a defendant should not be punished due to
police misconduct. At first, a sentencing manipulation claim was
predicated upon outrageous government conduct-that is, a constitu-
tional violation.0 3 While a constitutional violation offers a valid foun-
dation to overturn a sentence, predicating a sentencing defense on a
constitutional violation may not provide the remedy sought. More
recently, the First Circuit has adopted a definition of sentencing ma-
202 See United States v. Sorrells, 287 U.S. 435, 456 (1932) (Roberts, J, concurring)
("It cannot be said that entrapment excuses [the defendant] or contradicts the obvi-
ous fact of his commission of the offense.").
205 See United States v.Jones, 18 F.3d 1145, 1153 (4th Cir. 1994) ("Citing the First
Circuit's opinion in [ United States v.] Conner [960 F.2d 191 (lst Cir. 1992) ], the Eighth
Circuit adopted the term 'sentence manipulation' for the theory that outrageous gov-
ernment conduct that offends due process couldjustify a reduced sentence.").
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nipulation that requires only improper police conduct to support the
defense.0 4 The legitimacy of this approach depends upon whether
adopting sentencing manipulation exceeds the scope of a court's su-
pervisory authority.
1. Outrageous Government Conduct as a Foundation for Sentencing
Manipulation
The Fourth, Sixth and Tenth Circuits would require "outrageous
government conduct," that is to say, a constitutional violation, in or-
der to prove a sentencing manipulation claim. If a sentencing ma-
nipulation defense is based on a constitutional violation, the court's
authority is obvious. The court is enforcing the defendant's due
process rights guaranteed by the Constitution.
The question arises, however, whether a new sentencing defense
is necessary if the defendant has suffered a constitutional violation.
Traditionally, a due process violation is remedied by dismissing the
prosecution. The Fourth and Seventh Circuits have noted that if a
defendant can prove that the government acted outrageously, then
the entire prosecution should be dismissed as a violation of due proc-
ess rights. These courts reason that it is hard to imagine a situation in
which a defendant's due process rights are violated to an extent war-
ranting a downward departure, but not violated sufficiently to warrant
a dismissal. 206 Essentially, either due process is violated, or it is not.
Thus, if a sentencing manipulation claim is based upon a constitu-
tional violation, the constitutional violation renders a new sentencing
204 United States v. Montoya, 62 F.3d 1, 3 (lst Cir. 1995) ("[W]here government
agents have improperly enlarged the scope or scale of the crime, the sentencing court
has ample power to deal with the situation ... by departing from the [Guideline sen-
tencing range].").
205 United States v. Moore, No. 95-5885, 1996 WL 452423, at *4 (4th Cir. Aug. 12,
1996) ("This court has not decided whether sentencing manipulation can everjustify' a
downward departure but did observe ... that, if recognized, the theory would require
proof of 'outrageous conduct.'"); United States v. Lacey, 86 F.3d 956, 963 (10th Cir.
1996) (stating that arguments "presented as 'sentencing factor manipulation'...
should be analyzed under our established outrageous conduct standard"); United
States v. Sivils, 960 F.2d 587, 598-99 (6th Cir. 1992) (stating in dicta that manipulation
might give rise to "a fundamental fairness defense against the higher sentence").
See United States v. Jones, 18 F.3d 1145, 1154 (4th Cir. 1994) ("We would note
our skepticism as to whether the government could ever engage in conduct not outra-
geous enough so as to violate due process to an extent warranting dismissal ... yet
outrageous enough to offend due process to an extent warranting a downward depar-
ture ... ."); United States v. Cotts, 14 F.3d 300, 306 n.2 (7th Cir. 1994) ("Our inclina-
tion, however, is not to subject isolated government conduct to a special brand of scru-
tiny when its effect is felt in sentence, as opposed to offense, determination.").
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defense unnecessary. A court should simply dismiss the entire prose-
cution.s 7 If the objective of a sentencing manipulation claim is
merely that the sentence should be reduced due to unwarranted po-
lice conduct, then the remedy for the constitutional violation goes
too far.
2. Supervisory Authority as a Foundation for Sentencing
Manipulation
An alternative to the "outrageous government conduct" standard
was suggested by the First Circuit in United States v. Montoya.2 5 In
Montoya, the court defined sentencing manipulation as government
activity that "improperly enlarged the scope or scale of the crime."
*
"Improper conduct" is something less than "outrageous conduct" and
does not require proof of a constitutional violation. 10 It is, however,
still related to the objective approach. Its rationale for departing
from the required sentence of the Sentencing Guidelines rests exclu-
sively upon police misconduct.
The First Circuit has not articulated its authority for acknowledg-
ing sentencing manipulation of this nonconstitutional variety. Since
McNabb, a court's supervisory authority has been the means by which
federal courts insure "proper standards for the enforcement of the
federal criminal law."2 1' Both the Supreme Court and the lower fed-
eral courts have generally assumed that the lower courts possess the
same supervisory authority as the Supreme Court.212 Presumptively,
M Fisher, supra note 59, at 2406 ("If sentence manipulation rises to the level of
outrageous conduct it must completely bar prosecution.").
62 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 1995).
2o Id. at 3 (emphasis added); see also United States v. Garcia, 79 F.3d 74, 75 (7th
Cir.) (explaining that "[s]entencing manipulation occurs when the government en-
gages in improper conduct that has the effect of increasing a defendant's sentence"
but holding that "there is no defense of sentencing manipulation in this circuit"), cert.
denied, 117 S. Ct. 158 (1996); United States v. Shipley, No. 95-1036, 1995 WL 442209, at
*1 (8th Cir.July 27, 1995) (describing sentencing manipulation as "stretching out an
investigation over longer periods of time involving more drug buys merely to increase
a defendant's sentence").
210 See United States v. Egemonye, 62 F.3d 425, 426 (1st Cir. 1995) ("[S]omething
less than a constitutional violation might suffice ....").
211 McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332, 341 (1943).
212 See Beale, supra note 105, at 1455 ("Although the source of the lower federal
courts' supervisory authority has not been identified, both the Supreme Court and the
lower federal courts have generally assumed that these courts possess supervisory
authority in their own circuits or districts like that wielded by the Supreme Court on a
nationwide level.").
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this is the authority upon which a court would rely to assert that it
may exclude evidence if it is tainted by prosecutorial misconduct. A
court using its supervisory authority to establish a defense would ar-
gue that the transactions tainted by manipulation should be excluded
from sentencing calculations because the court cannot be an accom-
plice to police misconduct.
Relying upon a court's supervisory authority, however, presents
several difficulties. As noted above, a court's supervisory authority is
quite arguably not grounded in the law.213 Neither the Constitution
nor specific legislation explicitly grants the courts their self-declared
supervisory authority. Nor do the courts' inherent powers include the
power to create a new rule to exclude relevant evidence from sentenc-
ing. An inherent power is one that is essential to a court functioning
as a court. Historically, Congress, not the judiciary, established sen-
tences.2 14 For many years, therefore, establishing the rules for sen-
tencing has not been essential to a court's ability to function as a
court. If a court's supervisory authority rests upon its implied powers,
such supervisory authority would not include the right unilaterally to
adjust sentencing structures.
If, however, one accepts that the courts do have supervisory
authority to establish some rules, the courts' authority in theory and
by mandate is limited and does not permit courts to adopt rules that
regulate police conduct. In United States v. Williams, the Court held
that its supervisory power could not be used to dictate prosecutorial
215standards outside the courtroom. The lower federal courts have ac-
cordingly refused to exercise their supervisory power where its pur-
pose would be to regulate prosecutorial conduct.21 6 In the context of
sentencing manipulation claims, several courts have expressed reluc-
tance to interfere with police, who need "leeway [both] to probe the
depth and extent of a criminal enterprise" and to establish proof be-
213 See supra notes 150-60 and accompanying text.
14 See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
215 See United States v. Williams, 504 U.S. 36, 46-47 (1992).
216 See Report to the Attorney General supra note 149, at 808 ("The Second Circuit has
recognized... that 'the federal judiciary's supervisory power over prosecutorial activi-
ties that take place outside the courthouse is extremely limited, if it exists at all.' And
two members of the D.C. Circuit have declared that 'we lack authority, where no spe-
cific constitutional right of the defendant has been violated, to dismiss indictments as
an exercise of supervisory power over the conduct of federal law enforcement agents.'"
(quoting, respectively, United States v. Lau Tung Lam, 714 F.2d 209, 210 (2d Cir.
1983), and United States v. Kelly, 707 F.2d 1460, 1476 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (Ginsburg, J.,
concurring))).
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yond a reasonable doubt.'" This hands-off approach reflects the the-
ory that regulating police tactics falls outside both the courts' special
competence and their inherent authority.
As a result, lower courts cannot establish new sentencing defenses
without overstepping their authority. The courts' supervisory author-
ity does not extend far enough to establish a sentencing manipulation
defense. A constitutionally based sentencing manipulation claim
goes too far because the remedy is to bar the entire prosecution. Fi-
nally, the legislative intent behind the Guidelines is not broad
enough to support a sentencing entrapment claim.
IV. RECOURSE TO THE LEGISLATURE
If the courts are overstepping their authority in establishing new
sentencing defenses, how can the problem of sentencing entrapment
and manipulation be resolved? Robert Underhill argues that because
the entrapment and manipulation problem arises in the executive
branch, the executive branch is best suited to address the problem.1 8
Underhill suggests that the problem could be solved by more strictly
219regulating undercover agents and prosecutors. In any undercover
operation where the defendant would be subject to quantity-driven
sentencing, the prosecutor would be responsible for investigating the
purpose of the investigation, the reason the defendant was targeted,
the rationale for the arrest, and the manner in which the quantity was
determined.22° If the investigation revealed sentencing entrapment or
manipulation, the prosecutor could, in extreme cases, drop the
prosecution. In less extreme cases, the prosecutor could (1) exclude
from the indictment any quantity of drugs or money that are attrib-
uted to the defendant as a result of entrapment or manipulation; or
217 United States v. Calva, 979 F.2d 119, 123 (8th Cir. 1992); see also United States v.
Jones, 18 F.3d 1145, 1155 (4th Cir. 1994) (declining to adopt a rule that would
.unnecessarily and unfairly restrict the discretion and judgment of investigators and
prosecutors"); United States v. Connell, 960 F.2d 191, 196 (1st Cir. 1992) (noting the
potential for exploitative manipulation of sentencing factors but concluding that
"[c]ourts should go very slowly before staking out rules that will deter government
agents from the proper performance of their investigative duties").
218 See Underhill, supra note 15, at 197 (noting that the "executive branch is the
ultimate source of the problem" and that "because the executive branch is charged
with the task of executing the law, it has a responsibility to do so in a manner consis-
tent with the intentions of Congress").
219 See id.
See id. at 198 (proposing that these requirements be placed in a jurisdictional
statement).
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(2) "not disclose the additional quantities to the sentence-computing
agency."2' Prosecutors failing to investigate and prosecute cases ac-
cording to these standards would be subject to disciplinary action.2
This proposal is seemingly manageable. Conducting the investi-
gation adds only a minimal burden to prosecutor's existing work. Be-
fore and during investigations, prosecutors are in communication
with field agents. Thus, assessing the purpose and methods of the
undercover investigation will merely formalize current practice. More
carefully scrutinizing and restricting the work of agents in the field
would prevent numerous abuses. Eliminating from sentencing any
amount of money or quantity of drugs resulting from manipulation
would more accurately reflect a defendant's culpability in sentencing.
Unfortunately, parts of Underhill's proposal may contradict the
Sentencing Guidelines as recently interpreted by the Supreme Court
in United States v. Watts.7  At issue in Watts was whether a defendant's
sentence could be based not only upon conduct for which she was
convicted, but also for conduct for which she was acquitted.2 4 The
Supreme Court ruled that "a jury's verdict of acquittal does not pre-
vent the sentencing court from considering conduct underlying the
acquitted charge, so long as that conduct has been proved by a pre-
ponderance of the evidence."2 In so ruling, the Court noted that the
official commentary to the Sentencing Guidelines states that a court
determining the applicable sentencing range may consider
"[c]onduct that is not formally charged or is not an element of the
offense."2 6 And in some instances, such as drug convictions, the Sen-
tencing Guidelines require that "all acts and omissions.., that were
part of the same course of conduct or common scheme or plan as the
offense of conviction" be considered by the sentencing court.2
7
22 Id. at 198-200.
22 See id. at 200.
22 117 S. Ct. 633 (1997).
24 See id. at 634.
Id. at 638. Thus, Cheryl Putra, whose case was considered in the Watts decision,
was sentenced for two drug offenses even though the jury found her guilty of only one
offense. See id. at 640-41 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Her sentence, based on the one
drug count for which she was found guilty, would have been 15 to 21 months. See id. at
640. The district court included the drug count for which she was acquitted and the
range increased by more than 50% to 27 to 33 months. See id. What would have been
a "one year plus" conviction turned into a "two year plus" conviction.
26 Id. at 636.
27 Id. at 637 (quoting U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1B1.3 cmt, back-
ground (1995), and id. § 1B1.3(a)(2)). But see Watts, 117 S. Ct. at 637-38 (stating that
the Court was not resolving whether "conduct that would dramatically increase the
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Underhill's proposal is partly unworkable under Watts in that it
infringes upon the court's authority, and in some instances duty, to
consider all conduct surrounding an offense. If the prosecutor re-
fuses to indict a defendant on a given charge or otherwise seeks to
exclude some element of the investigation from the court's consid-
eration based upon an investigator's conduct, the prosecutor is at-
tempting to remove from the court's purview elements of the offense
that the Supreme Court has indicated the sentencing court has the
authority or obligation to consider.
A second problem with looking to the executive branch for a so-
lution to sentencing abuses is that the executive branch is part of the
problem. Prosecutors, like undercover agents, know the Sentencing
Guidelines and know how to conduct a prosecution in order to
maximize a potential sentence.28 Institutional changes are, of course,
possible, but the fact of prosecutorial complicity in sentencing en-
trapment and sentencing manipulation suggests that an exclusively
executive branch solution will prove insufficient.
If neither the courts nor the executive branch is fully capable of
resolving the dilemmas posed by sentencing entrapment and manipu-
lation, this leaves the legislative branch. The legislative branch,
through the Sentencing Commission, could resolve this dilemma by
simply broadening the scope of Application Note 15. Application
Note 15 currently limits a court's discretion to depart downward only
to cases of reverse sting operations where the undercover investigator
offered the defendant a price substantially below market value. The
application note could be revised to allow a sentencing court to con-
sider a downward departure in any case in which the court finds by a
preponderance of the evidence2 ° that the defendant had no predis-
position to engage in the relevant conduct or where the government
agent engaged in conduct solely for the purpose of increasing the de-
fendant's sentencing range.2s Such an amendment does have a sig-
nificant drawback. Namely, it reintroduces the discretion which the
sentence must be based on clear and convincing evidence"). The Court's finding in
part contradicts the purpose of the Guidelines. When district courts may choose
which conduct to include to set the base offense level, some district courts will include
the conduct, and others will not. This will result in different base offense levels for the
same conduct and is exactly the type of disparity the Guidelines sought to eliminate.
See supra notes 47-50 and accompanying text.
SeeU.S. SENTENCING GUIDEINES MANUAL § 2D1.1, Application Note 15 (1995).
2N A preponderance of the evidence is the standard of proof required at sentenc-
ing. See Watts, 117 S. Ct. at 638.
231 For other suggestions regarding how the Guidelines might be appropriately
amended to account for sentencing manipulation, seeJohnson, supra note 15, at 224.
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Sentencing Guidelines were explicitly established to eliminate. On
the other hand, such an amendment would merely shift discretion
from the executive branch to the judicial branch with no net change
in sentence discrepancy. Furthermore, such an amendment would
eliminate otherwise tortured interpretations of the current Sentenc-
ing Guidelines to arrive at the same result, address the current prob-
lems of sentencing entrapment and manipulation, and allow courts to
arrive at sentences that are more closely attuned to a defendant's ac-
tual culpability. A revised amendment to the Sentencing Guidelines
implemented along with more supervision of undercover agents
would do much to eliminate questionable sentences.
CONCLUSION
The search for sentencing defenses is an admirable one. Those
courts advancing the theories of sentencing entrapment and sentenc-
ing manipulation wish to see that sentences are tailored to the indi-
vidual's criminality and that police officers are held to civilized stan-
dards. Nonetheless, in establishing these defenses, courts are
fundamentally altering the sentencing scheme duly established by
Congress. Some sixty years ago, when the courts initially considered
the entrapment defense, proponents offered two different legal bases
for its establishment: legislative intent and the court's supervisory
authority. Then, as now, neither is an entirely satisfactory ground for
a court-developed defense to a legislative enactment. With regard to
legislative intent, courts face an uphill battle to show that Congress,
when it established a uniform sentencing structure based on harm,
really meant to consider individual intent. With regard to supervisory
authority, it is not clear that courts have the authority to create rules
which effectively control activity of agents in the executive branch.
The courts might, nonetheless, establish sentencing entrapment or
sentencing manipulation defenses. If Congress fails to overturn the
courts, over time these defenses will, like the original entrapment de-
fense, gain legitimacy through use and Congressional acquiescence.
Thus, despite the lack of legal grounding, sentencing entrapment
and sentencing manipulation could become accepted defenses.
Rather than advocating the establishment of these defenses through
the back door, this Comment argues that the most legitimate and ef-
fective way to gain the protection for defendants that the courts are
seeking is through a degree of self-regulation by the executive branch
of the behavior of its undercover agents and a straightforward legisla-
tive amendment to the Sentencing Guidelines.
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